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A HISTORY OF THE GREEK PEOPLE


(1821 - 1921)

WILLIAM MILLER

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HISTORIES OF THE PEOPLES

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G. P. GOOCH.

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A HISTORY OF THE GREEK
PEOPLE

UNIFORM WITH THIS VOLUME
A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE
BY
GUY DE LA BATUT AND GEORGE FRIEDMANN

M.

A HISTORY OF THE GREEK PEOPLE (1821—1921)

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
G. P. GOOCH

WITH TWO MAPS

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INTRODUCTION

By G. P. GOOCH

THE outstanding feature of our age is neither nationality nor democracy, nor applied science, but the growing consciousness of the essential unity of mankind, both on the material and on the spiritual plane. Since the murders at Sarajevo in 1914 it can no longer be argued that any part of the earth is too remote or any country too insignificant to concern the life and fortunes of every one of us. The world has become a hall of echoes, a vast whispering gallery. For good or evil the civilized nations form a single family. Isolation spells stagnation and hermit kingdoms are out of date.

The most urgent task of the coming years is to substitute the reign of law in the relations of States for the moral anarchy which brought the old Europe to its doom. But the League of Nations will only establish itself as our guardian and our guide if it rests on the explicit assent of the plain citizen, by whom governments are chosen and to whom statesmen are ultimately responsible. It is no longer enough to be a good Englishman

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or even a good European ; for as members of the League we are now also citizens of the world, and must never forget that civilization is a collective achievement and a common responsibility.

Our new status brings obligations as well as privileges, among them the duty of knowing more of our fellow-members in the association of nations. Without such knowledge we can never understand why they act and think as they do, nor can we measure the value of their contribution to the making of the world in which we find ourselves. The more we can learn of the life and growth of other lands the better. There are indeed many claims on our energies ; but there should be no difficulty in a person of average intelligence finding time to master brief narratives of at any rate the later chapters of the story of the nations. What he wants—and what the writer who knows his business will give him—is not a sterile record of wars and dynasties, but a historical interpretation of the events and institutions, the social life, the ideas and ideals which influence the fortunes or express the individuality of organized political communities.

Mr. William Miller is the greatest living British authority on mediæval and modern Greece. His larger works are the treasured companions of the historical scholar ; but readers of this little volume will quickly discover that he carries his learning lightly and can adapt himself to the needs of the beginner no less than to those of the expert. He

writes with sympathy yet without flattery of the gifted people whom he knows so well. There is nothing more romantic than the survival of the Greek nation and the Greek language in unbroken continuity from classical times ; and no country could wish for a more competent recorder and interpreter of its trials, its achievements, and its aspirations.



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**A HISTORY OF THE GREEK
PEOPLE**

A HISTORY OF THE GREEK PEOPLE

CHAPTER I

THE GREEK PEOPLE UNDER FOREIGN RULE (146 B.C.-1821 A.D.).

MOST persons, and especially those who have had a classical education, are wont to be interested in modern Greece because of the literary reminiscences of ancient Greece. But this habit, which does not affect the public judgment of the other states of South-Eastern Europe, is both historically defective and practically unjust to the Greek people. Greek history is a whole ; its stream does not, like some of the Greek rivers, disappear underground at the date of the Roman Conquest in 146 B.C., to emerge again into the light of day with the War of Independence in 1821. For many centuries Greece was under foreign rule, Roman, Frankish and Turkish, and they have naturally affected to a more or less degree the character of her people. To expect, as some literary enthusiasts expected, that the

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Greek notables who fought against the Turks in the time of Byron, would be endowed with the same qualities as the leading Athenians of the age of Perikles was as absurd as to imagine that the Roman, Saxon and Norman conquests of England have not modified the British mentality.

Modern Greece is politically, and especially in foreign politics, far more the child of the Byzantine Empire than she is the grandchild of the little classical Republics. Nevertheless, the traveller will be struck by the similarity between the modern Greek character and the real (as distinct from the supposititious) qualities of the ancient Hellenes. No one now believes the iconoclastic theory of Fallmerayer, that the Slavonic and Albanian invasions of the Middle Ages uprooted the Greek race in Europe. The dogma of 1830 that "not a drop of pure and unmixed Greek blood flows in the veins of the Christian population of contemporary Greece" is historically false and practically absurd. Like the olive-shoot which grew up again and bore fruit, although the goat had eaten it down to the root, the germs of Hellenism have survived the successive blows of alien rulers and invaders. The Greeks have absorbed these foreign elements, and notably the numerous Albanian colonies in their midst, rather than have merged in them. Across these long centuries the Greek language, modified as all languages are by the course of ages, has remained, in a sense in which Latin has not remained, a spoken tongue, and

Greek literature, which text-books usually cut short at the Alexandrian period, really extends through the learned scholars of Byzantium and the popular "Chronicle of the Morea" down to the novelists and poets of to-day. There are rival schools of language in modern Greece, the "purist" and the "popular"; but their respective instruments are both ultimately derived, although by different routes, from the divine workshop of Homer and the other classics, largely thanks to the immense influence of the New Testament.

From the moment when Rome had emerged victorious from her struggle with Carthage, it was obvious that she would endeavour to extend her sway over the South-Eastern peninsula, just as her modern successor has tried to establish her influence over Albania. Even before the fall of Hannibal, an Akarnanian embassy had given Rome a pretext for arbitrating in Greek affairs by asking her to bid the Ætolians desist from attacking Akarnania, and Corfu became the first of Rome's "allies," the first step towards annexation, for the "ally," when he had served his turn, ended as a subject. The Federal Greece of Polybios was no match for the military power of Rome, and the Romanophil historian ¹ records the current saying of his distracted countrymen: "if we had not perished quickly, we should not have been saved." There are moments of historic

¹ XL, 5.

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evolution when a foreign occupation may be in the ultimate interests of a country ;—although no material advantage can compensate for the loss of national independence. So, while, in Horace's phrase, "Captive Greece took her fierce captor captive" by the silken chains of her literature and art (just as, after 1453, captive Byzantium revived Greek letters in Western Europe), Rome gave to Greece a better government than the Greeks could have then organized. Local autonomies were respected, financial administration was admittedly purer, and the "Roman peace," except when Greece became the battlefield of Rome and Mithridates, Cæsar and Pompey, Octavian and Antony, took the place of an endemic state of war. Young Romans, like Cicero and Horace, studied at Athens, which became an University town, and the Academic conflicts of rival professors and their respective bands of students took the place of the debates between the practical statesmen of the once free city. Then came the greatest event in the history of Roman Greece, the introduction of Christianity—an event which influenced politically perhaps even more than religiously the whole evolution of the Greek people. The keenly dialectical minds of the Greeks found in theology an intellectual field of discussion which more than compensated for the decay of philosophy ; politics at Byzantium were largely a question of ecclesiastical dogma, and the Iconoclast controversy, which divided the Greek Empire into hostile

camp, arose out of a question of images in the churches. Down to our own day, the Greek hierarchy has been in "unredeemed" Greece the symbol of Hellenism, and in the dark days of Turkish rule the Orthodox Church saved the nation.

The transference of the capital of the Roman Empire from Rome to Constantinople, while it injured the old Greek lands by draining them of their population and reducing them to a mere province, residence in which was regarded as an exile by the elegant Byzantine courtiers, gave to the world a new Greek civilization. It used to be the fashion to despise Byzantine culture and literature. But Byzantium was a centre of light at a time when Western Europe was plunged in the darkness of barbarism, nor were the Byzantine rulers the effeminate creatures that Western prejudice has sometimes depicted them. During the eleven centuries of the Eastern Empire great soldiers, great lawgivers, great statesmen sat upon its throne, and we are apt to forget among the scandals of palace revolutions and the intrigues of mundane prelates, which fill so many pages of the Byzantine historians, the life of the common people and the services rendered by Byzantium to the world. Nor is the long series of Byzantine historians an unworthy supplement to the classical writers. The Byzantine writers were often pedantic and rhetorical, but they were also often men of official experience with a first-hand knowledge of

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affairs ; and, had it not been for them, large portions of not only Greek, but Serbian, Bulgarian and Turkish history would have remained unknown. Byzantium has exercised, and still exercises, a great influence upon Athens. Modern Greek statesmen have dreamed of reviving, and M. Venizelos realized, the exploits of Nikephoros Phokas in liberating Crete and of Basil II, the "Bulgar-slayer," in driving the Bulgarians from Macedonia. The historical arguments for Greek expansion, which have figured before the public in recent years, have been drawn, not from the small Republics of ancient Greece, but from the great Byzantine Empire.

The Crusades provoked the first serious political conflict between the East and the West, already ecclesiastically divided by the separation of their Churches in 1053. The rough barons from the West could not understand the subtle Byzantine mentality, and their weapons of steel were often powerless against the silken web of intrigue which the clever Greek diplomatists wound around them. The zeal of the Greek Emperors for the liberation of the Holy Places from the Infidels was considerably tempered by the suspicion—realized in 1204—that the Crusaders might turn aside from their avowed object to plunder and partition the rich Empire which they traversed. There were faults on both sides, but the mutual errors were natural, for when have East and West really comprehended one another ? To the Franks the Greeks seemed

slaves, to the Greeks the Franks seemed savages. The Latins represented character, the Greeks intellect. So it came to pass that a mere handful of miscellaneous adventurers from the West overthrew in 1204 the oldest Empire in the world, and established the Frankish domination over a large part of the Hellenic world. The Greek centre of gravity was shifted to Asia Minor and Epeiros; two Greek Empires arose at Nice and Trebizond, the former of which merged in 1261 in the restored Greek Empire of Constantinople, the latter survived as an independent state by eight years the Turkish capture of that city; while in Epeiros a scion of the Imperial family of the Angeloi founded a Greek principality ^{or} "Despotat," which became the rallying-point of Hellenic aspirations and the refuge of Hellenic refugees in Europe. A network of Latin states, radiating from the Latin Empire of Romania at Constantinople, was spread over Greek lands. The Latin Empire and the Latin Kingdom of Salonika soon passed away; but the Duchy of Athens and the Principality of Achaia lived far into the fifteenth century; the Venetian Duchy of the Archipelago and the Genocse Chartered Company of Chios were not destroyed by the Turks till 1566; the Lusignan Kings and their successor, the Venetian Republic, held the Greek island of Cyprus down to 1571; Crete remained a Venetian Colony till 1669, and three strategic points in Cretan waters were held by Venetian garrisons for many years longer; there

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was a Venetian revival in the Morea, owing to the victories of Morosini, between 1685 and 1715; the island of Tenos was not taken by the Turks from Venice till the latter year, and the Seven Ionian Islands with their dependencies were Venetian as late as 1797. The French then succeeded the Venetians, and later on the British the French, till in 1864 the Islands were annexed to the Greek Kingdom.

Long as was the Frankish domination over Greece, the two races never amalgamated, and the so-called *gasmôûloi*, or half-breeds, born from mixed Franco-Greek marriages, like the similar *poulains* in the Holy Land, combined the vices, rather than the virtues, of both races. The Greeks, like the Anglo-Saxons, assimilate other races rather than are assimilated by them; the differences of creed formed a further barrier between the two peoples; and a mysterious law of population made many Frankish baronies descend into the hands of women in an age when masculine prowess was the first quality in a ruler. Latin rule over the Greeks took several aspects: now, as in the Principality of Achaia, that of an elaborately organized feudal state; now, as in Crete, that of a colony; at Rhodes it was exercised by a religious Order; at Chios by a joint-stock company. But everywhere, except in a few cases, of which the Gattilusj of Lesbos are the most noteworthy, the Latin lords remained aliens in race and religion, though not, after the first

generation, in language, to their subjects, who sometimes welcomed the Turks—and lived to repent their welcome—as a relief from the rule of Western Christians. No period of Greek history is so romantic as this feudal age ; but the charm of life in the brilliant mediæval Courts of Athens and Thebes, or in the joysome pleasaunces of Cyprus, must not blind us to the fact that Frankish domination was an unnatural, and therefore a transient, creation.

The Turks, who captured Constantinople in 1453, made themselves masters of the Greek mainland and the Morea a few years later, except for a few Venetian colonies in the latter, which became Turkish in 1540. From those dates, with the exception of the Venetian revival at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries, the continental Greeks were united beneath a single yoke down to the War of Independence in 1821. The head of their Church lived under the control of the Turkish Government at Constantinople ; many of their cleverest men entered the service of the illiterate conquerors, and the posts of Dragoman of the fleet, Grand Dragoman of the Porte, and *Hospodar* of the two Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were often held by able Greeks, who in this way were able to serve the interests of their poorer compatriots at the same time as their own. Like the Franks, the Turks did not amalgamate with their Greek subjects. They were a garrison

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in Europe rather than a permanent population, and allowed a considerable measure of self-government to the native communities. Most towns had their local officials, "elders," *archontes*, or "primates," as they were called, and an English traveller found that the Greeks of Athens, who practically administered their own affairs, lived "much better here than in any other part of Turkey, with the exception of Scio, being a small commonwealth among themselves." It was transferred in 1760 from the black eunuch to the Sultan's privy purse. Maina, after 1770, was governed by a local chief, appointed by the Sultan for life with the title of *bey*, the "twenty-four hamlets of Volo" flourished under autonomy; Mount Athos was a monastic Republic; the twelve Southern Sporades, the so-called *Dodek-ánesos*, now in Italian occupation, had enjoyed special privileges since the conquest of Rhodes. Education was not neglected in its ancient seat, but it is to Joannina, where Eugenios Boulgaris taught, that modern Greece owes the preservation of the torch of learning in Turkish times. Koraes of Chios founded modern Greek literature; Rhegas of Velestino provided the new Greece with its anthem. But for the first two centuries of Turkish rule the tribute of Christian children for the recruitment of the Janissaries involved an enormous loss to the Greek population, which has been estimated at about a million. Moreover, most of the natural leaders of the Greek people, the men

of political, military and intellectual attainments, became exiles, so that the local landowners, the peasants and the priests remained its sole representatives. But, as under the Romans, so under the Turks, the Greeks obtained peace, after the disappearance of the Venetian flag from the Morea, until Russia began to take the place of Venice as a possible redeemer of the subject-races of Turkey. Finally, after the failure of the Russian expedition of 1770, the Greeks began to realize that "those who would be free themselves must strike the blow." The Serbs set an example to the rest of the Balkan peoples by their successful rising in 1804; the British protectorate over the Ionian Islands gave to one section of the Greek race a foreign, but, at the same time, a just and benevolent administration, which was no bad training for the islanders; and the *Philikè Hetairía*, or "Friendly Society," was founded at Odessa in 1814 to promote a Greek insurrection against the Turks, while Ali Pasha of Joannina appealed in his own interests to the Greeks for aid against the Sultan. Greek shipowners had, it is true, greatly profited by being subjects of a neutral state during the early years of the French Revolutionary War; but, despite their comparative prosperity, the Greeks were observed to bear "the Turkish yoke with greater impatience than other Christians," although, on the whole, they suffered least from it.

The "Friendly Society" sent welcome "apostles"

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to Greece ; many eminent Greeks, like Petrobey Mavromichales, the Prince of Maina, in the far South of the Morea, joined its ranks ; and its leadership, after having been refused by Count Capo d'Istria, the distinguished Corfiote, who had risen high in the Russian service and was destined to become President of Greece, was accepted by Prince Alexander Hypselantes, an officer in the Russian army and eldest son of a *Hospodar* of Moldavia and Wallachia. He raised the standard of revolt in the Danubian Principalities, with which his family was so closely connected, and on March 6, 1821, crossed the Pruth, at that time the Russo-Turkish frontier. But the rule of the Greek Princes was unpopular with the Roumanians ; the Latin peasants felt no enthusiasm for the Hellenic cause, and a Nationalist revolution, with the programme of Greece for the Greeks and Roumania for the Roumanians, hindered the progress of Hypselantes. His followers fought bravely at Dragashani, and even after their leaders' flight, at Skuleni. But this prelude to the War of Independence ended in failure ; it was on the soil of classic Greece that freedom was won.

CHAPTER II

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GREEK KINGDOM (1821-33).

IT was in the Morea, on April 6 (March 25, O.S.), that Germanos, the Metropolitan of Patras, raised the sacred banner, representing the death of the Virgin, in the Church of the Monastery of Hagia Lavra near Kalavryta. The rising speedily became general and continued till 1829. The military operations of the war do not concern us; we have only to examine its political and social results. The Greeks of that period were not, and could not reasonably have been expected to be after the long Turkish domination, classical heroes and sages, as over-enthusiastic Philhellenes, nourished on Plutarch's "Lives," insisted that they must be. The result was the inevitable disillusionment with corresponding damage to the Greek cause, which continued for a generation after the establishment of the Greek kingdom. The truest friends of a foreign nation are never those who idealize it, but those who, like Byron, take into consideration its human defects as well as its sterling qualities. Tried by this standard, the War of Greek Independence was

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much what might have been anticipated. It contained feats of great heroism and deeds of considerable atrocity ; at times the Greek leaders showed themselves able to rise to a high level of patriotism, at others, notably during the " War of the Primates," their mutual jealousies plunged their country into civil war.

But at the outset public opinion, especially in England, where sentiment plays a larger part in politics than among Latin peoples, was on the side of the Greeks, and in Canning, who succeeded Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary in 1822, and who recognized them as belligerents, they found a powerful supporter. For the first four years they were successful ; from 1825, when Ibrahim arrived in the Morea, to the almost complete annihilation of the Turkish fleet in the bay of Navarino by Admiral Codrington and the Allies in 1827, the tide turned ; from that time onward till 1829 European intervention secured the creation of some sort of a Greek state, of which the first diplomatic indication had been the Duke of Wellington's successful effort to induce the Tsar, Nicholas I, to sign the protocol of April 4, 1826, suggesting internal autonomy for the Greeks on payment of an annual tribute to Turkey. This was followed on July 6, 1827, by the treaty of London, by which Great Britain, France, and Russia pledged themselves to demand an armistice from both parties, with the object of creating such a state as Wellington and the Tsar had proposed.

In the following year Russia declared war upon Turkey, and in 1829 the peace of Adrianople, whither the Russians had advanced, thus compelling the Sultan to withdraw all his available troops from Greece to defend his capital, included his recognition of the treaty of London. Thus, as in the liberation of Bulgaria fifty years later, the Russian sword and English public opinion—Byron and Gladstone—were the main factors in the Turkish defeat.

Meanwhile, it had become obvious that the head of the new Greek state must be a foreigner. After the failure of the experiment, made by the Constitution of Epidavros in 1822, of appointing the Phanariote Greek, Alexander Mavrokordatos, as President, and of the similar system, elaborated by the second National Assembly at Astros in 1823, it was realized that no Greek would recognize another Greek as his sovereign, but that all Greeks would be willing to accept the seion of some European Royal family as their ruler. Roumania (after trial of a native head), Bulgaria and Albania much later, all sought their Princes from Germany, that nursery of Balkan monarchs; whereas the two Serb states, Montenegro and Serbia, have had native dynasties. But Montenegro was a Homeric autoocracy, while Greece is a democracy, and a large part of Serbian history, down to the tragedy of 1903, was occupied by the feud of the two great native families, that of Obrenovich and that of Karageorgevich. There was, indeed, one Greek

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of commanding experience, Count John Capo d'Istria, and the National Assembly of Troizen elected him President of Greece for seven years. But Capo d'Istria's temperament and Russian training both unfitted him to rule over a country such as the Greece of 1828, and the latter made him unpopular with Great Britain and France. The London protocol of March 22, 1829, involved his political extinction; for it provided that the Greek territory south of the Gulfs of Arta and Volo should be an hereditary monarchy under a Christian prince, to be chosen by, but not from, the dynasties of the three protecting Powers, Great Britain, France, and Russia, under the suzerainty of the Porte. The inclusion of this protocol also in the treaty of Adrianople ensured its recognition by the Sultan. Another protocol, of February 3, 1830, was a further advance on the road to Greek freedom. The results of the late Russo-Turkish War had convinced Wellington that the end of Turkey was nigh—a foreboding shared by many European statesmen since his time, but even now not completely accomplished, even in Europe, although the Turks now hold in that—to them alien—continent little more than Constantinople and its immediate surroundings. The corollary of Wellington's conviction was that it would be useless to place Greece under so weak a suzerain; but, since he believed that she would become a satellite of Russia (as Beaconsfield equally erroneously believed of Bulgaria in 1878),

his policy was to make her an independent, but not too large, state. Nearly a century of Balkan history has proved the folly of this argument.

The real barrier against external intervention in the Near East consists of a chain of strong Balkan states, which, however much they may quarrel among themselves—and in that respect they resemble their rather Pharisaical and “superior” Western critics, the Great Powers—are united in disliking foreign intervention, be it Turkish, Austrian, or Russian, as in the past, or Italian, as in the present or future, in their affairs. Greeks, Jugoslavs, Bulgarians and Albanians, mutually detesting each other, are united in desiring “the Balkan Peninsula for the Balkan peoples,” just as the Iberian Peninsula belongs exclusively to the Spanish and Portuguese, and the Italian to the Italians, instead of being treated, like Greece in the Frankish period, or Africa to-day, as colonial territory for European exploitation. But the men of 1830 had not the experience of 1921. Consequently the frontiers of the completely independent Greek state, which the protocol of February 3 sought to create and the government of which it entrusted to a hereditary “Sovereign Prince of Greece,” chosen outside the reigning families of Great Britain, France and Russia, were cut down to the mouth of the Spercheios on the East and to that of the Acheloos on the West, and, while including Eubœa and the Cyclades, excluded all the other islands and most important

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of all of them, Crete. This last omission cost that island several insurrections, Greece the expenditure of large sums upon the relief of Cretan refugees (which seriously crippled her finances), and Europe an almost constant annoyance and danger to the peace of the East in the shape of a "question," settled, at last, in 1912-13, after various diplomatic makeshifts, by the only natural solution—union with the Greek kingdom.

Yet, even in 1830, there was one far-seeing statesman, who warned Lord Aberdeen, "that he could imagine no effectual mode of pacifying Greece without including Candia in the new state." This was Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who had been chosen as sovereign of Greece, and who had at first accepted. By his withdrawal of his acceptance Greece lost, and Belgium gained, a wise ruler, who might have made Athens an Eastern Brussels and would, in any case, have been a better ruler than Otho. Fairness to the Greeks demands that this initial mistake of the Powers should be held responsible for many of the troubles of the modern kingdom. If Greece was unable to devote exclusive attention—as her critics, and especially her English critics, suggested—to her internal affairs, that was largely owing to her unsatisfactory frontiers and, above all, to the exclusion of "the great Greek island," whence, in the end, came her greatest statesman. If she was poor and unproductive, that was not her fault, but that of the Powers, who deliberately shut out from her narrow

boundaries the richest Greek lands, leaving to her the "thin soil" of Attica, but to the Turks the rich mastic-island of Chios and Thessaly, (since its annexation in 1881) the granary of Greece.

Thanks, indeed, to Palmerston and Sir Stratford Canning (who had been on the spot) the frontiers of 1830 were enlarged by the final arrangement of 1832 as far as the Gulfs of Arta and Volo, including the disputed district of Lamia. Greece thus was no longer deprived of the brave Akarnanians and of many of those Ætolians who had borne so distinguished a part in the war; she no longer had to leave to the Turks the strategic pass of Makry-noros. But both the keys of "Ambrakia's Gulf, where once was lost the world for woman," the town of Preveza and the fort of Punta, the site of the classic Actium, remained in Turkish keeping, the latter till 1881, the former till 1912. The Seven Ionian Islands were under a British protectorate; Crete had been united in 1830 to the Egyptian pashalik of Mehemet Ali, as a reward for his services to his suzerain, and Egyptian it remained till 1840, when, against the wishes of the Christian Cretans, who formed the majority of the population, it was restored to direct dependence upon the Turkish Empire, of which, at the time of the War of Independence, it had been, according to the British traveller, Pashley, "the worst-governed province." Another Greek island, Samos, which had taken part in the national

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struggle and, when liberated, had been organized by the future Greek Prime Minister, Kolettis, was blockaded, and forcibly erected in 1832 into an autonomous Christian principality—a form of government which existed for eighty years. Thus the Greece of 1832, which remained unenlarged till the Union of the Ionian Islands in 1864, was a torso, thanks to one of those partial solutions dear to diplomacy but contrary to nature and history. Still, the Greeks had obtained what they had lacked for nearly four centuries, what the Albanians lacked till 1914, what the Armenians still lack to-day—a national home, small, indeed, but their own. Their small kingdom became the cynosure of the rich Greek colonies of Western Europe and Egypt, the nucleus of the greater Greece that was to be, and which, by the genius of a great man, was realized four score years later. For this little Greece some men lived solitary and laborious lives in order that they might bequeath to her their fortunes; and in the narrow limits of the classic land the Greeks of the dispersion found a country which inspired their patriotism. Having gained Greece, they sent money to adorn it.

Meanwhile, the internal condition of the Greeks had become chaotic. Capo d'Istria had become more and more unpopular; the French Revolution of 1830 had increased the democratic feeling against his methods and his family; and his culminating error was to employ the Russian

fleet against the "Constitutional Committee" of the famous "Nautical island" of Hydra, which had seized the Arsenal at Poros. The sack of Poros by the presidential troops recalled the Turkish exploits of the late war, and an affront to the pride of the famous Mainate clan of the Mavromichalai, of which Petrobey was the head, led to his assassination at Nauplia on October 9, 1831, by Constantine and George, two members of that family, which, in our own time, has given a Prime Minister to Greece. Anarchy followed this savage act of vengeance, typical of the land of Maina, almost independent in Turkish days, where, as in modern Albania, the *vendetta* was still the popular usage. Civil war followed between the late President's brother, Agostino, the chairman of a triumvirate, and his colleague, Kolettes, who had been a physician at the Court of Ali Pasha of Joannina and represented "Rumelia," as continental Greece was then called. Finally, the three Powers offered the Crown of Greece to Prince Otho, the second son of King Louis of Bavaria. The father was favourably known in Greece as a Philhellene, the son, then a lad of seventeen, had been put forward as a candidate by a travelling professor, Thiersch, who had acted as his electoral agent among the Greek notables.

The choice was not fortunate, for what was wanted was a man of experience; but it was argued that Otho, being young, would the more easily assimilate the ideas of his new environment,

while the experience of affairs, until he came of age, would be provided by a Regency of three Bavarians, Count von Armansperg, Dr. Maurer, and General von Heideck, of whom the last alone had had any practical acquaintance with the people placed under his charge. A treaty between Bavaria and the three Powers regulated the terms of Otho's acceptance of the crown. He was to be King, not "of the Greeks," like King George,—for that would have aroused the suspicions of Turkey—but "of Greece," which was declared an independent, hereditary monarchy under the guarantee of the three—not very fairy-godmothers. If he died childless his younger brother was to succeed him, but in no case was the same person to be king of both Greece and Bavaria. A corps of Bavarians was to organize a native army; the Powers guaranteed a loan to the new kingdom. Such were the auspices under which the young King landed at his capital of Nauplia from a British frigate on February 6, 1833. He was young and full of hope; his advent was welcomed as a relief from the anarchy of the previous sixteen months; and it was felt that any monarch was better than civil war.

CHAPTER III

BAVARIAN AUTOCRACY (1833-43)

THE country which Otho had come to rule was in no enviable plight. Any land which has had the misfortune to be governed by the Turks is always devoid of the elements of material progress ; roads require making, harbours dredging, and marshes draining ; the only means of communication are mule-tracks ; broken-down wooden jetties take the place of piers ; and malaria scourges regions which in the golden age of antiquity nourished flourishing cities. Such as is Albania to-day (save for the improvements made by the Austrians and the Italians during the late war), such was Greece in 1833, with the great additional disadvantage of having been the theatre of a bitter racial and religious struggle, followed by internecine conflicts, for nearly twelve years. Centuries of subordination to foreign masters had developed that spirit of intrigue which was innate in the Byzantine character, while the love of politics is as inbred in the Greek as is the love of education. It is always harder to govern a highly critical and political people than the more stolid Northern nations, and the heavy Bavarian intellect

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was unadapted to deal with the versatile Greek mentality. The Regency soon set the gossips of the small world of Nauplia talking; the discord between Armansperg and Maurer was enhanced by the airs which the former's wife gave herself, and the foreign representatives began to interfere in internal Greek politics, just as, in the time of the Obrenoviches, there were Austrian and Russian parties at Belgrade, and in 1914, at the similar petty court of Durazzo, the Italian and Austrian Ministers intrigued with rival Albanian parties. Consequently, the Regency was not a success; it would, indeed, have been a miracle if it had succeeded.

After disbanding the irregulars—always a difficult problem in the Balkans after the end of a war—the Regency proceeded to the formation of a Greek Ministry under Spyridon Trikoupes, the historian of the Revolution and father of the still more celebrated statesman of the latter part of last century. The Bavarians committed the mistake in their internal policy of substituting a highly centralized bureaucracy for those ancient municipal liberties which even the Turks had respected. The kingdom was divided by a paper symmetry into ten nomarchies, subdivided into forty-two eparchies, and these last again into demes, of which the chief, or demarch, was nominated by the Crown and could be suspended by the Minister of the Interior. A complicated code and a theoretical system of education were imposed

upon a country as yet unfit for either, and the press was manaeled by the necessity of depositing large sums as caution money for its good behaviour. Now to the Greeks, ever eager "to tell or to hear some new thing," the newspaper is a necessity of existence; so, when the Regency by its severe press restrictions made it impossible for the Opposition journals to live, the critical spirit of the people was deprived of its natural vent and forced into subterraneous channels.

Upon another palladium of the Greek people the daring foreigners laid their profane hands. It was necessary to cope with the problem of the Orthodox Church now that there was a free Greek kingdom, for obviously it would be unwise to allow the head of that Church, the Œcumenical Patriarch, who was practically the prisoner of the Sultan in the Phanar at Constantinople, to exercise supreme authority over the ecclesiastical affairs of the independent Greek state, especially as in the Near East the barrier between the spiritual and the temporal authorities is slender; for, if few Eastern politicians are religious men, nearly all Eastern churchmen are politicians. It was natural, then, that, in 1833, a decree, signed by thirty-four bishops, should proclaim the Orthodox Church within the Greek kingdom to be independent, and governed by a synod of five prelates, to be named by the King. This declaration of ecclesiastical independence would in itself have called down the thunders of the Patriarch, for the

Patriarchs have yielded nothing in ambition, but only in the means of gratifying it, to their Western rivals, the Popes. But the reformers did not stop there. They provided for the reduction of the superabundant hierarchy to ten, arguing that one bishop apiece was adequate provision for the ten nomarchies. Struck with the large number of monasteries, whose inhabitants were mostly picturesque, but idle, peasants, rather than meditative theologians or leisurely scholars, engaged in research, they suppressed and nationalized (like the Italian Government in 1873) all religious houses inhabited by less than six monks. Vested interests naturally rallied to the side of the Patriarch; and the monks saw in this measure the work of foreigners and schismatics, who governed in the name of a Roman Catholic King and were engaged in a conspiracy against monasticism. The Bavarians in this were only following the policy of that great Byzantine Emperor, Nikephoros Phokas—a policy which made him unpopular and would make foreigners doubly so.

Not till 1850 did the Patriarch recognize in a "Synodal Tome" the independence of the Orthodox Church in Greece; not till 1852 was complete peace restored. Since then two events have further diminished his authority: the erection of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, which raised up a formidable rival against him in Macedonia; and the Greek victories of 1912-13, which led to the annexation of many Turkish districts, containing

Orthodox sees,¹ to the Greek kingdom. Thus, Sofia on the one hand and Athens on the other alike gained at the expense of the Patriarch, who is likely in the future, except for his historic name and long traditions, to be less important than the Metropolitan of Athens. So, in the last days of the Greek Empire, the little strip of territory round Constantinople, to which it had shrunk, was really less important than the Byzantine "Despotat" of Mistrâ in the South of the Morea, which was theoretically only an appanage of it.

A revolt of the mediæval land of Maina, where every man's tower was his castle and the Bavarian policy of pulling down the towers was regarded as an infringement of that individual liberty, which the Turks had not crushed, completed the difficulties of the well-meaning Germans, who had undertaken to put Greece in order. Maurer was recalled, and while he issued his *Apologia pro vitâ suâ* in the shape of his big book on "the Greek people," his more fortunate rival, Armansperg, governed it without further restraint from any one.

In 1834 Athens became the capital of Greece, and Nauplia, with its beautiful gulf and picturesque Venetian walls, descended to the rank of a provincial town. There had been three competitors for the honour and profit of being the Greek Royal residence—Nauplia, which was indicated by considerations of economy and vested interests; Corinth, which could point to its central situation,

¹ Not yet, however, definitely regulated. *Infra*, p. 145.

its twin seas—to be connected in 1893 by the present canal—and the ample expanse of building-land afforded by the Isthmus ; and Athens, which was, for historic reasons, the only possible capital of modern Greece, as was Rome of modern Italy, until such time—so the dreamers of “the Great Idea” thought—as it should please Providence to drive the Turk from Constantinople and replace there those who, in those early days long before the birth of Bulgaria and the treaty of San Stefano, seemed to themselves—and to many others—his only heirs. But the fine modern city which we know to-day, with its marble houses and its suburbs gradually creeping down to form with its busy port a single town, is very different from the combination of noble classic monuments and sordid ruins—the results of the war—which greeted Otho on December 13, 1834. Prior to the war, after the twenty years’ exceptional tyranny of Hadji Ali, its governor in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Athens had been described as “happy and beautiful,” occupied with local politics and education. But it had not yet recovered. The Piræus, now one of the busiest harbours of the Levant, then consisted of three wooden shanties, and at Athens the King had to live at first in a one-storied house, similar to those which in our time served as the residences of eminent personages at the Montenegrin capital.

A lady-in-waiting of Queen Amalia—the daughter of the Grand-duke of Oldenburg, whom Otho

brought back as his bride from his European tour two years later—has left a graphic description of the conditions of social life at Athens in the early years of its transformation into a Royal residence. Material progress was rapid, perhaps too rapid; for, if the Bavarians drained the poisonous marshes and laid out the road to the Piræus, which became the favourite promenade of the Court, they sacrificed not a few mediæval churches in their zeal for building a modern city. We may, at least, be thankful to the King of Bavaria, that the terrible suggestion of imitating the Florentine Dukes of Athens in the fifteenth century and erecting his son's palace on the Akropolis, was abandoned. A spot was chosen out of range of a bombardment from the sea—as the King of Bavaria expressed it—a calculation falsified in December, 1916. But ignorance of an Eastern climate caused the construction of wide and shadeless thoroughfares, instead of the narrow and shady lanes of Turkish Athens, regardless of that scourge of this waterless city, the dust, which modern macadam has done something to diminish.

Among the prominent creations of those early years was the foundation of the University, at first lodged in a modest house at the foot of the Akropolis, and later transferred to the present fine building, in which, in 1912—that *Annus mirabilis* of modern Greece—was celebrated, amidst a concourse of scholars from all over the world, its seventy-fifth anniversary. It was pro-

phesied by that shrewd old chieftain, Kolokotronis, as he pointed first to the University, then to the Palace, that the day would come when "this house will eat up that one"—a prophecy fulfilled at the revolution of 1862. For, if the Athens University has produced some remarkable scholars, it has also produced many politicians, who have increased that intellectual proletariat which does not tend towards the stability of Governments in democratic Southern countries. There have been two occasions in our own time when the University students have overthrown Cabinets by their hostile demonstrations; but it must be set down as a compensation for this drawback that the University has provided "the Great Idea" with some of its most fervent apostles. The Macedonian, Thracian, Cretan and Asiatic Greeks who studied at Athens returned to their homes not only with their diplomas as lawyers, doctors or teachers, but with the patriotic resolve to work for the union of "the outer Greeks" with the Greek kingdom. If the University shook the throne of Otho, it has also dismembered the Turkish Empire. As a powerful dissolvent of Turkish rule, it has a place in Greek history, besides that to which its scientific achievements entitle it.

Even after Otho attained his majority in 1835, Armansperg, now "Arch-Chancellor," retained influence till his policy, become more and more autocratic, provoked such continual complaints that, in 1837, the King appointed another Bavarian,

Herr von Rudhart, to take his place, but with the more modest title of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Armansperg had enjoyed the support of Great Britain; his successor's brief term of power was embittered by the opposition of the British Minister. Nothing can be worse for the political development of a young country than the dependence of its Cabinets upon foreign Legations. But Athens, in the days of Otho, was the diplomatic cockpit of the three Powers, and "English," "French," and "Russian" parties flourished under the respective leadership of Mavrokordatos, Kolettes and Kolokotrones.

An attempt was now made to Hellenise the Cabinet, only one place in which was given to a Bavarian; but the King counteracted the popularity which he would otherwise have obtained from this concession to public opinion, by acting as his own Prime Minister and presiding over the Cabinet Councils, while what was practically a privy council of Bavarians stood between him and his Ministers. For the criticism, which, under the usual constitutional practice, would have been diverted to the Premier, was inevitably focussed on the person of the King, who was regarded, like King Constantine eighty years later, as the party chief of a cabal. Other causes contributed to bring about the agitation which culminated in the revolution of 1843. The application of conscription in the army to the mariners of the "Nautical island" of Hydra, already hard hit by

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the losses of the war and a recent earthquake ; an unpopular commercial treaty with Turkey, with which, in 1839, Greece for the first time entered into official diplomatic relations ; the inability of the Greek Government to profit, as the Nationalists desired, by the embarrassments of the Sultan during his second conflict with his rebellious Egyptian Viceroys, Mehmet Ali ; the failure of the Cretan insurrection of 1841 ; the Russian demand for payment of interest on the loan ; and the necessity for economies in official salaries—all these causes united to provoke the movement of September 13, 1843, which is one of the red-letter days of modern Greece. British statesmen, always convinced that the magic word “ constitution ” will heal all the ills of all countries on whatever plane of civilization, be it Greece in 1843 or Turkey in 1908, in vain advised Otho to grant constitutional government. He listened to the advice of his father, who held that a constitution would cost him his throne, in accordance with the doctrines then current in Germany. On this occasion the British theory was right, the Bavarian wrong.

The revolution was largely the work of the “ English ” and “ Russian ” parties, then led respectively by Andrew Lontos and Andrew Metaxas. Their collaboration was due to the common desire to expel the Bavarians, but for different reasons ; for the British objected to Otho because he was an autocrat and the Russians

because he was a Roman Catholic. London wanted a king to be Constitutional, St. Petersburg wanted him to be Orthodox. Both leaders wrongly calculated upon his obstinacy, believing that he would abdicate rather than yield to the demand for a constitution. As usual, the revolutionary movement mainly interested the politicians, who, finding the people, especially the peasants, mostly indifferent, invited the army to help them. They discovered suitable instruments in Col. Demetrios Kallerges, a member of the well-known Cretan family, who had nearly lost his life in the War of Independence, and in Col. Makrygiannes, who had also distinguished himself during that struggle. At one in the morning of September 13th, the King was alarmed at his desk, where he was still laboriously studying the details of public business, which should have been left to a clerk, by cries of "Long live the Constitution !" Showing himself at a window, he asked Kallerges what he wanted ; and, when he heard that what was wanted was a constitution, ordered the troops to disperse. The troops obeyed the orders not of the King but of Kallerges ; the artillery, which Otho had called to his aid, joined them. The politicians then appeared upon the scene ; a deputation of the Council of State waited on the King and begged him to grant a constitution. At this critical moment the diplomatic corps arrived, and requested an audience. But Kallerges, prompted by the British representative, Sir E. Lyons, who thought

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that the moral support of his colleagues might make the King obstinate and was, therefore, anxious to have the Royal promise to grant a constitution extracted before they entered, declined firmly but politely to admit them until the deputation was over. The King, thus left alone, gave way, summoned a National Assembly of 225 members for the purpose of drawing up a constitution, dismissed all foreigners from his service, except the veterans of the War of Independence, and appointed a new Ministry. Shouts of "Long live the Constitutional King, Otho I," greeted the sovereign, and the revolution of September 3, as it is called in Greek history, was over with the loss of only one life.

This peaceful transformation of the Government from an autoeracy to a democracy, from a foreign to a native administration, contrasted markedly with the sanguinary revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in France—a country far more civilized than contemporary Greece. No party defended the old system, which had lasted for ten years and had been found wanting; consequently there was no conflict between Greek and Greek. The date is still cherished as the birthday of parliamentary institutions—the only form of Government adapted to the Greeks, despite its obvious defects. The Bavarians had not governed well; but, even if they had, the Greeks would naturally have preferred to be less well governed by themselves. Still, like most benevolent autoeracies, Bavarian

absolutism had done something for the material welfare of the governed, although the progress of the country during this first decade was largely due to the people rather than to its rulers. There was more land under cultivation, more silk exported, more currants planted ; a National Bank had been established, the marble quarries re-opened, the mercantile marine had recovered from its losses in the war. Athens had a population of 35,000, or more than thrice its population in 1765 ; three other towns, the Piræus, Patras and Syra were acquiring importance. Intellectually, the Archæological Society and the University marked an advance ; the language was being purged of foreign words ; and the King and Queen had set the example of “discovering” the beauties of Greece by their constant journeys, often at considerable personal discomfort, up and down that difficult country, as it was in the days before railways or even carriage roads. Otho and his Queen, whatever their political faults, dearly loved their adopted land, as is now generally realized, and had they had children, their descendants might still be sitting on the throne.

CHAPTER IV

THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO REVOLUTIONS (1843-62)

“**T**HE National Assembly of September 3,” which met to draw up the Constitution, was composed not only of delegates who were Otho’s subjects, but also those of “outer Greeks” from Crete, Thessaly, Epeiros and Macedonia, who formed so important a factor in the history of Hellenism in the nineteenth century. There was, however, an “autochthonous” party in the Assembly, which succeeded in excluding from official posts those Greeks, Turkish subjects and, therefore, “heterochthonous,” who had taken no active share in the war. This distinction, while beneficial to those intellectuals who had had the good fortune to be born in Greece proper, restricted the area of choice, for some of the most advanced Greeks were to be found in the “outer” Hellenic world. But in those early days there was considerable jealousy between the more cultured Phanariotes and the native notables; the black coat and the fustanella still represented divergent planes of social evolution; nor has the antagonism of Athens and Byzantium, as we have

seen in the case of M. Venizelos, unpopular at Athens, adored at Constantinople, wholly ceased even now.

On another point, that of the independence of the Orthodox Church of Greece from the Great Church in Constantinople, except in matters of dogma, the Assembly was decided that the former should continue to be "autocephalous." It was also resolved that the heir to the throne must belong to the Greek Church, and that the parliamentary system should be bi-cameral. The usual argument was advanced, that a second Chamber would serve as a conservative check upon the first. But political experience has shown that a check, to be effective, must, except in small questions, be exercised by a minority in the lower House ; and, so far from being a check, the Greek Senate (or *Γερουσία*) furnished the platform for the first attacks upon Otho and gave to the Opposition the means of criticizing the Government. In 1864 the Greek Senate was abolished ; meanwhile it was formed of at least twenty-seven persons, who (like the Italian senators) had reached the age of forty and (also like the Italians) were nominated for life by the Crown from certain categories. The numbers of the Senate might be increased to one-half of those of the Chamber (or *Βουλή*), which were never to be less than eighty, all over the age of thirty (like the Italian deputies), and elected for three years by manhood suffrage. Members of both Houses were paid—a practice

only recently introduced into Italy and not yet into the Italian Senate. On March 30, 1844, Otho took the oath to the Constitution, after a discussion of four months, conducted, as a British statesman remarked, with "self-command highly creditable to the Greek nation."

The enfranchised Greeks had now obtained command of their own destinies; it lay with the native statesmen to determine how the country which had been reborn with such great expectations should comport herself. There were two policies before the country in 1844, for either of which there was something to be said. There was the homely policy of the "English" party under Mavrokordatos, that Greece should first put her own house in order before pursuing the "Great Idea" of uniting the still scattered fragments of Hellenism—Crete, Epeiros, Macedonia and the rest—with the small Greek kingdom. This latter, according to the programme of the "English" party, should by competent internal administration, prudent finance and the maintenance of law and order, make Greece a model of good government throughout the Near East. When these practical, if humdrum, objects had been achieved, then, argued the advocates of this policy, Europe would recognize, when the break-up of Turkey came, that little, but well-governed, Greece deserved to be the "sick man's" only heir.

Kolettis, the Epeirote who led the "French" party, supported the—to the Greeks—more

congenial plan of making the territorial expansion of Greece the first object. This policy not only appealed to the Imperialistic sentiment, which animates all Balkan nationalities, and is fostered by their long and mutually conflicting historical traditions and their strong feeling of exclusive nationality, but could also be justified by the specious argument that the best forces of the nation were still outside the Greek kingdom, and that they would not be available for its internal regeneration until its frontiers had been enlarged so as to include them. Both parties would have agreed in considering Greece as the only Balkan candidate for the succession to the Turkish heritage, and not without reason at that date. For, in 1844, no one dreamt of a revived Bulgarian state or even of a Bulgarian Exarchate; no one had yet "discovered" the "Macedonian Roumanians," who then all passed as Greeks—the common designation of all the Orthodox; no one imagined that the little Serbia of Alexander Karageorgevich would become the great Jugo-Slavia of his present namesake. At that time "the Hellenic factor in the Eastern question" was, if small, still the only one within the Balkan Peninsula. Russia or Greece seemed in 1844 to be the only alternative, and there were Greeks who, despite the lesson of 1770, believed that because Russia was Orthodox, she would also be Philhellene. As might have been expected, the programme of Kolettis prevailed, and that politician—for he can scarcely

be called a statesman—retained power till his death in 1847.

The policy of expansion continued, with occasional intervals, to characterize Greek public life down to the time of Charilaos Trikoupes; it was the line taken by his rival, Deligiannes, and triumphed in the skilful hands of M. Venizelos. But, looking back over this period of four score years, we may ask whether Greece would not have profited more in the long run by a stricter attention to internal affairs in the reign of Otho. Western statesmen are apt to judge the states of South-Eastern Europe by their domestic stability; what is reckoned patriotism in the Occidentals is considered Jingoism in the Oriental; and, in the still imperfect development of self-determination in this world's affairs the opinion of the great Powers has much influence on the fate of the small. But the initial mistake was with the Great Powers themselves, who, in 1832, made the frontiers of Greece too small for a growing body.

Kolettis, who for the next three years dominated Greek politics, is one of the most interesting figures of modern Greece. In some respects he resembled Sig. Giolitti; for he never indulged in rhetorical speeches, but managed the Chamber by personal contact with the deputies and small expedients. A man without large views, such as could hardly have been expected from the ex-physician of Ali Pasha's son, he possessed extraordinary skill in the useful art of keeping a party together. His

supporters, mostly drawn from the less Europeanized elements in the population, the so-called "National party"—in itself a handy catchword—could always drop in upon their affable chief, whom they found clad in the fustanella and smoking his long pipe, like one of themselves. No applicant for office left his presence without a promise—not always fulfilled—of prompt attention to his request; and the indignant visitor, who entered the Minister's room with fury, was calmed by his "sweet words" till he left it soothed by the persuasive tongue of the charmer. To the French Kolettes, who had been Greek Minister in Paris, was the one and only Greek statesman; like the Allies in our own time in the case of M. Venizelos, they "put all their money" upon him alone; and, when he died, they consequently found themselves isolated—indeed, political immortality, apart from the natural insecurity of life, is the lot of no Eastern statesman; and a policy, based on one man, however eminent, is liable to be defeated by the fickleness of his own compatriots. Moreover, French support of the Premier procured for him British pinpricks, which took the form of demanding payment of interest on the loan and complaints about brigandage. His policy of expansion inevitably provoked incidents with Turkey, which culminated in a diplomatic question at Athens between the King and the Turkish Minister, Mousouros, the translator of Dante, which led to the expulsion of Greek

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consuls from Turkey. The people, however, continued to prosper despite the frequent ministerial crises, which followed the death of Kolettes, and the sporadic risings in various parts of the country.

In 1850 there occurred the first serious incident between Great Britain and Greece—an incident enormously exaggerated, and unduly honoured by being made the occasion for Palmerston's historic phrase, *Civis Romanus sum*. The "Roman," or rather British, "citizen" on whose behalf the resources of the British Empire were invoked by the paternal Minister against a tiny state, was a Jew from Gibraltar, a certain Don Pacifico, whose house at Athens (where he had been Portuguese Consul-General) had been pillaged during an anti-Semitic disturbance three years earlier, owing to the prohibition of the burning of Judas Iscariot in effigy at Easter. For the Greeks and the Jews do not usually love each other, although before the annexation of Salonika there were few Jews in Greece. Don Pacifico, relying on his British citizenship, sent in a bill of over £30,000 for material and moral damages. The opportunity was taken of combining with his case five other claims of various British and Ionian subjects, besides the contention, advanced eleven years earlier, that the islands of Cervi and Sapienza off the South Coast of the Morea were part of the Ionian Islands.

Of the personal claims one possesses special

interest from the name and fame of the claimant, George Finlay, the eminent historian of Mediæval and Modern Greece, who had taken part in the War of Independence, had subsequently settled in Athens, where he lived till his death, writing his great history and for some years acting as correspondent of *The Times*. He had bought land there, a portion of which had been enclosed in the royal garden, and for this he demanded 45,000 *dr.* as compensation. Accordingly, Mr. (afterwards Sir Thomas) Wyse, the British Minister, presented an ultimatum, followed by a blockade of the Piræus by Sir William Parker—the first of the three British blockades in modern Greek history. Public opinion abroad was generally opposed to Palmerston's headstrong action, and even Finlay, usually severe in his judgments upon the people, whom he had come to emancipate, and whom he remained to criticize, confessed that "the British Government acted with violence, and strained the authority of international law." The House of Lords condemned, and the House of Commons confirmed, the Minister's Greek policy by small majorities; France and Russia, in their quality of protecting Powers, remonstrated with him; and although the Greek Government yielded, his roughness had injured British relations with those two great states. A mixed commission reduced Don Pacifico's claims for the loss of certain vouchers for sums, said to be due to him, from over £26,600 to £150, and nothing more was heard of Cervi and

Sapienza. The person who benefited most by the blockade was Otho, whose popularity with his subjects was thereby enhanced at British expense, as a German propagandist reminded the Greeks in the late war.

British and Greek policy again clashed four years later, at the time of the Crimean War. It was natural that Orthodox Greece should sympathize with Orthodox Russia in the question of the Holy Places, out of which that futile struggle, as the late Lord Salisbury considered it, arose. It was equally natural that the devotees of "the Great Idea" should think the moment come, when Turkey was in difficulties, to profit by them for the emancipation of Epeiros and Thessaly. But a spirited foreign policy requires not only enthusiasm but material force behind it, and the Greece of 1854 was not the Greece of 1912. King Otho and his patriotic Queen, who had found in the politics of her adopted country an outlet for her childless energies, were the real leaders of the war party, and, as usual in the Balkans, bands crossed the frontier with the tacit acquiescence of the regular authorities. The enthusiasm spread to the Ionian Islands, where, as during the War of Independence, the British Protectorate could with difficulty make its Greek subjects observe neutrality when the opposite continent was ablaze. But the insurrection in Epeiros and Thessaly failed, and the liberators did not always spare those whom they had come to liberate. Thessaly had to wait

twenty-seven years more, Epeiros fifty-eight, for union with Greece.

The situation was made worse by a Turkish ultimatum, and Greece was on the verge of a war, which would probably have been disastrous in her then state, had not British and French troops occupied the Piræus. Napoleon III wanted to go farther, on the advice of Kallerges, and dethrone Otho, whose only crime was his undiplomatic patriotism. Instead, Kallerges became the chief member of an "Occupation Cabinet," of which the old statesman of the War of Independence, Alexander Mavrokordatos, was Premier. Relations with Turkey were resumed; the commercial treaty of Kanlijeh was signed; and the Anglo-French troops remained at the Piræus till 1857, while their presence there and that of a still less welcome visitor, the cholera, at Athens, increased the popularity of the martyred king and his plucky consort, always at their posts in the hour of danger. For two years after the Allies' departure Otho continued popular, and Greece, freed from the incubus of the Eastern question, made practical progress. A cable connected her two chief ports, Syra (whose prosperity dated from the Massacre of Chios during the War of Independence) and the Piræus; the narrow strait which separates Eubœa from the mainland was made available for vessels; serious steps were at last taken to suppress the curse of brigandage, which About had utilized for his famous but unfair caricature of Othonian

Greece ; and, had Otho had children, there would have been no awkward question of the succession, complicated by the necessity, laid down in 1852, of the successor's conversion to the Orthodox Church, which seemed to be the only cloud over the Palace.

The Greeks, with their intense love of politics, are wont to take great interest in those of their neighbours. Every reader of the Greek press is struck by the large amount of space given to the affairs of other countries ; every one who has conversed with Greeks is amazed at their knowledge of foreign politicians. Consequently the Austro-Italian War of 1859, although not directly concerning the Greeks, aroused among them immense popular enthusiasm for the Italians, just as, in a minor degree, the Libyan War of 1911. Otho, as a South German, naturally sympathized with Austria, and his position towards his people was, therefore, somewhat like that of King Charles of Roumania during the Franco-German War of 1870 and at the outbreak of the War of 1914. By this time also there had entered politics a new and more democratic generation of men, the product of the University, whose leader was Epaminondas Deleorges. Moreover, while circumstances had thus created a gulf between the Crown and the people, the three Powers were indifferent or worse, for Great Britain would have preferred some one less inclined to a policy of expansion at the expense of herself in the Ionian Islands and of her *protégé*, the Turkish

Empire, the integrity of which was then an axiom of British statesmanship. Plots and risings became frequent; the garrison of Nauplia, where Otho had landed in 1833, revolted, and the revolt was suppressed by bloodshed; an attempt to divert attention from home affairs by a repetition of the policy of 1854, with the aid of Garibaldi, and an alliance with Serbia at a moment when Montenegro was at war with Turkey failed; and during one of the Royal progresses round the Morea, the old Venetian fortress of Vomitza on the Ambrakian Gulf gave the signal for the revolution of 1862, which cost Otho his throne. Before the Royal yacht could return, Athens, under the leadership of Delegeorges, had proclaimed his deposition; the diplomatists advised him to accept it as an accomplished fact. Otho left Greece for ever; but, in exile at Bamberg, he never forgot the country which he had loved only too well and had governed with only too minute attention. His abdication was the result of an almost bloodless revolution, like that of 1843; but it involved Greece in chaos for nearly two years till at last a king was found, who maintained his throne for nearly fifty by an opposite system to that of Otho—by letting his Ministers govern as they liked, and by signing the documents submitted by them without a pedantic study of their contents. Yet King George, with all his tact, did not escape the dilemma of most Near Eastern monarchs—abdication or assassination.

CHAPTER V

THE INTERREGNUM AND THE IONIAN ISLANDS (1862-4)

UPON Otho's fall a Provisional Government, consisting of Boulgares, Kanares and Roupfos, had been formed to direct affairs until a National Convention should have elected a king, for it was realized that the marked individualism of the Greek character and the lack of any one commanding personality would render a Republic impossible. Even fifty-five years later, when there was such a personality, he was the first to see that the dethronement of one monarch involved the succession of another. But the difficulties of selection which faced the National Assembly of December, 1862, were far greater than those which confronted the Powers upon the dethronement of King Constantine. For Otho had no offspring, and no Greek wanted one of his Bavarian relatives. If the Greeks had had their way they would have made Prince Alfred, second son of Queen Victoria, their king. Personal, as well as practical, reasons were in his favour. He had made himself popular during a recent visit to Athens, and even before the revolution he had

been mentioned as a possible successor to Otho. More important were the hopes of substantial favours to come from Great Britain in the event of a British Prince being selected. The British Government would present him, it was said, with the Ionian Islands as a coronation gift, and might even persuade, or compel, the Turks to add Epeiros and Thessaly thereto. In any case British capital would surely follow him, and the resources of Greece would be thus developed in a way that would have been impossible under the impecunious Bavarians. Similarly at present it is the dream of the Albanians to find a Prince belonging to an affluent nation which will bring them the latest inventions and improvements of civilization without expense to themselves.

But the Greek supporters of the British Prince were met by an official British refusal. It was contrary to the protocol of February 3, 1830, that a member of any reigning family of the three protecting Powers should occupy the Greek throne, and this prohibition excluded both Prince Alfred and the Duke of Leuchtenberg, the Russian and French candidate, who was nephew of Alexander II of Russia. Moreover, the Prince of Wales was then unmarried, so that Prince Alfred was only one degree removed from the succession to the British Crown, while he was actually heir-presumptive to the Duchy of Saxe-Coburg, to which he ultimately succeeded. Queen Victoria also refused her consent ; but, in spite of all these

denials, the result of the *plébiscite* of “outer” as well as “autochthonous” Hellenes, which was held for the election of a king, gave 230,016 votes for the British Prince as against 2,400 for the Russian Duke, and only 93 for a Republic. There were several scattered votes, but not one for a Bavarian. Despite the ratification of this popular vote by the National Assembly, in the hope that the British Government would recognize the accomplished fact, it maintained its refusal, but promised to find a king somewhere else. The promise was hard to fulfil, for not every suitable candidate wanted to undertake the romantic but difficult task of reigning over Greece.

After fruitless application to the inevitable house of Saxe-Coburg, the British at last found a king in Prince Christian William Ferdinand Adolphus George, second son of Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein (who a few months later became King Christian IX of Denmark), and then a lieutenant in the Danish navy. Once again a youth—for the new king was only seventeen—had been chosen to occupy a throne, for which ripe experience seemed to be the first essential. It was arranged that his title should be “George I, King of the Hellenes,” that his heirs should belong to the Orthodox Church, and that the Ionian Islands should be added to his kingdom, on condition—so a secret Anglo-Danish treaty provided—that he promised not to encourage insurrections against Turkey. Otho had refused to sacrifice the much

worse governed Greek subjects of Turkey as the price of liberating the much better governed Greek subjects of Great Britain. Generous pecuniary provision, partly at the expense of the Ionian Government, was made for the new king. That Government was to be asked to devote £10,000 a year to his maintenance, while each of the three Powers relinquished in his favour £4,000 a year out of the sums due to them by the Greek Government.

Meanwhile, during these lengthy negotiations, Athens was in a state of civil war. The Assembly was divided into the rival factions of "the mountain" and "the plain." Athens, fond of imitating Paris fashions, had already had, like Paris in 1848, her "days of February"; she now, like Paris in 1830, had her "days of July." The palace was bombarded, the National Bank besieged, and some 200 persons fell in a conflict which the representatives of the Powers ascribed to "culpable ambitions"—the ambitions of the rival leaders to be in office at the time of the young King's arrival. At last, on October 30, he arrived, accompanied by a Danish political adviser, Count Sponneck, whose tactlessness soon won for him the unpopularity of Otho's Bavarian Regents. But King George quickly emancipated himself from his Danish privy councillor and placed his complete confidence in his native Ministers.

No one in 1864 could have predicted that this young lieutenant, with no previous knowledge of the country and no experience of affairs, would

have succeeded, as he did succeed, in the difficult task before him. But King George possessed a royal quality more valuable than genius, diligence or commanding ability—tact. Placed over an extremely democratic people he was at once democratic and dignified; with rare exceptions he never interfered with the policy of his Ministers at home, while abroad, during his annual journeys to “Europe,” as the Greeks call the West, he was their best Ambassador. His family connections were an immense asset to his country; he never allowed personal considerations to prevent him from working cordially with a Minister whom he might not like, but whom his people supported. Like every Greek ruler, he had in his fifty years’ reign his ups and downs: twice, in 1897, after the disastrous war against Turkey, and in 1909, at the time of the Military League, he needed all his skill; but he lived to witness not only the union with the Ionian Islands and the annexation of Thessaly and Arta, but the great triumph of 1912.

The Ionian Islands, which were the first addition to the Greek kingdom, differed from the latter and from its subsequent accretions in the important fact that only one of them, Santa Mavra (the ancient Leukas), had been for any long period under Turkish rule, which Corfu, for example, had never known. Consequently they had been spared that material decay which is implied in the proverb that “the grass never grows where the Turk’s horse has trod.” Corfu had been for

more than four centuries under Venetian rule prior to 1797, and Venice had, and still has, left her mark on the architecture, the speech and the manners and customs of the Corfiotes. After the (except in the case of Santa Mavra) long Venetian occupation, the Seven Islands and their continental dependencies, Butrinto, Parga, Preveza and Vonitza, were annexed by the French, who sought to excite enthusiasm by recalling, at Bonaparte's orders, "Greece, Athens and Sparta" in their proclamations, by "planting the tricolour on the ruins of the palace of Ulysses" at Ithake, and by talking of liberty to the newly-emancipated Ionian peasants.

The popularity of the French soon waned; their liberal policy in putting Jews on the provisional council offended Corfiote anti-Semites; their sarcasms about St. Spyridon, the patron-saint of the island, wounded religious susceptibilities and outweighed the real improvements, such as the establishment of the first Greek press in Corfu, "that of the nation," and the greater security of life under French rule. When Russia and Turkey made an unholy alliance against France, the Œcumenical Patriarch bade the faithful Ionians join those strange allies against "the atheistical nation of the French." The success of this combination led, on March 21, 1800, to the erection of the islands into a "Septinsular Republic," a vassal of, and tributary to, the Porte, and guaranteed by Russia and Turkey, which

were to send troops thither only for defensive purposes. The continental dependencies were ceded to the Porte. The "Septinsular Republic," despite its lamentable failure, its frequent changes of constitution, and its indulgence in revolution, saw the foundation of the first Greek public school in Corfu, and forms a landmark in the history of the Greek people as "the first autonomous Greek state of modern times." Its first attempt at a federal constitution with a local council of nobles in each island, and a central senate, presided over by an *Archon*, at Corfu, was a venture in aristocracy, and its brief career was ended, after the treaty of Tilsit, in 1807, by a second French annexation. Napoleon reconsidered Corfu exclusively from the standpoint of his strategic plans as "more important than Sicily," and this second French administration was purely military. France, however, spent 60,000,000 *frcs.* on the islands in seven years, and founded an academy at Corfu; but British cruisers and the continental blockade injured Corfiote trade, the Corfiote nobles were excluded from office, and their olives—the staple product of the island—cut down for the fortifications without compensation. Meanwhile, in 1809, the British took the four southern islands; by 1810 Corfu and Paxo alone remained to the French, and before the middle of 1814 all the islands were in British hands. The Corfiotes received the British with enthusiasm; as yet there was no counter-attraction in the shape of a Greek

state. The future gaoler of Napoleon, Sir Hudson Lowe, organized the southern islands; Sir James Campbell was the popular Governor of Corfu.

The principle of Nationality was held in small repute by the statesmen who recast the map of Europe in 1815. The Convention of November 5 created "The United States of the Ionian Islands" under the protection of the British Crown. The new Ionian state was wholly insular; it consisted of the seven islands and their small, dependent islets, tacitly including therefore Saseno,¹ in the bay of Valona, of which we have recently heard so much in connection with the Albanian question. This, like most diplomatic arrangements, was a compromise. The British plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Paris had asked for the complete sovereignty over the islands and also over their former continental dependencies. The Russian delegate, Capo d'Istria, a Corfiote by birth, who had taken an active part in the agitated politics of the islands, would yield to Great Britain nothing beyond a protectorate over both parts of the state, the insular and the continental. To this the British answered that, if they could not have full sovereignty, they would, at least, have nothing to do with the continental dependencies, a protectorate over which would have brought them into collision with the Turks, to whom the Russo-Turkish Convention of 1800 had ceded them, and

¹ See the Author's article on Saseno in *The Morning Post*, May 11, 1913.

who—or, rather, whose independent satrap, Ali Pasha of Joannina—had conquered all the four, except the famous Parga. The actual settlement was unsatisfactory to the British, who were thereby placed in a position peculiarly exposed to criticism from people who were adept critics. “Liberated nations,” wrote Bismarck, “are not grateful but exacting,” and the Ionians had not been fully liberated. Whether they could have governed themselves, however, in 1815, may be doubted, and that is the best defence of the British protectorate, which certainly benefited them more than their protector. Meanwhile, the islanders welcomed with joy the decision of Europe, and, with incongruous taste, a still surviving Ionic temple was erected at Corfu to the rough, but benevolent soldier, “King Tom” (as Sir Thomas Maitland was called), who became the first Lord High Commissioner of a group of islands steeped in the haze of Homeric story and imbued with long years of Venetian refinement and state craft, alien to the straightforward, blunt but just, British system.

A constitution was, of course, the first British measure; but the Conservative charter of 1817, which remained in force till 1849, was intentionally so framed as to give to the Ionians the shadow, while reserving to the High Commissioner (or *Harmostés*, as the Greeks classically styled him, with a characteristic allusion to the Spartan governors appointed by Lysander in the subject

Greek cities), the substance of power. Ionian constitutional history since 1800 had not been encouraging, and perhaps the paternal statute of 1817 was the wisest instalment of liberty under the circumstances in a time of general reaction—for this was the year of the “Sidmouth circular” and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act even in England. “King Tom” took as his model the second aristocratic Constitution of the Sept-insular Republic, which the Russian plenipotentiary, the Zantiote Count Mocenigo, had drawn up for his fellow-islanders in 1803. He first nominated a “Primary Council” of eleven Greeks under the presidency of a Corfiote noble, who was both a patriot and an Anglophil, for the purpose of summoning a Constituent Assembly, composed of the eleven councillors and twenty-nine others elected by the islands from a double list of candidates, prepared by the “Council,” which then submitted to this Assembly a draft constitution. The islands were thereby endowed with a “Legislative Assembly” of eleven *ex officio* and twenty-nine elected members, chosen in the above manner, and a “Senate” of six, of whom the President was an Ionian noble, appointed by the Crown, that is, by the High Commissioner, and the others were elected by, and from, the members of the “Legislative Assembly,” subject to his veto. Of these five elected senators, four represented the larger islands, while the fifth represented by rotation the three smaller. The High Commissioner

had also the prerogatives of summoning extraordinary sessions of the Legislature, which normally met in the capital of Corfu only every other year, and of dissolution; upon him depended the re-nomination of his "Highness," the President of the Senate, the chief native official of the insular state; the approval of the High Commissioner, who resided in Corfu, was needed to confirm the nomination by the Senate of the local "Regents" of the other six islands, and the "Regents" could not act without that of his "Residents" in their respective domains. He and his nominee, the President of the Senate, were *ex officio* members of the "Supreme Council of Justice," of whose four legal members the two Ionians were elected by the Senate with his sanction, and the two British appointed by the Crown. The press was strictly official, for the High Commissioner and the Senate could hinder the establishment of any private press, and for long the only Ionian newspaper was the official *Gazette*, and that printed in Italian. Indeed, Greek was not compulsory in the public offices till 1852, and English was the language of the postal, police and sanitary departments, and Italian till 1849 that of the legislature. Yet when the writer visited Corfu in 1914, the Jubilee of the Union with Greece, an old Corfiote protested strongly against the employment of Italian even in private conversation.

Thus, the Constitution of 1817 left the High Commissioner practically supreme, and the polity

aristocratie, as it had been before. Maitland's system was to create a large bureaucracy to provide posts for the educated natives and so keep them contented, to flatter Ionian vanity by titles and orders, but to break up large estates, to save the peasants from money-lenders, and to begin those fine roads which the Greeks allowed to fall into disrepair after the protectorate. He was no sentimentalist or Philhellene, but a benevolent ruler, who tried to improve the people without sympathizing with their national ideals. But he and all his successors understood the importance of recognizing the predominance of the Greek Church, and of paying profound respect to the processions of St. Spyridon—a policy repeated by the British "Harmosts" in Cyprus. The troubles which the Italians have had with the Orthodox Church in Rhodes illustrate the sound statesmanship of our administrators in this respect. *Qui mange du Pape, en meurt* applies with equal force to the Oriental "pope."

Maitland's indifference to national sentiment caused him to settle on purely material grounds a burning question of patriotism which, although unduly magnified by poets and Anglophobe historians like Pouqueville, was a blow to British prestige, and long did us harm in the Greek world. Parga, immortalized in the verse of Byron, lies on the Epeirote coast opposite Paxo, and formed one of those continental dependencies of the Ionian Islands which the Convention of 1800 had

ceded to Turkey. It had, however, been garrisoned by the French during their second occupation of the islands, and remained in their hands till, at the invitation of the inhabitants, it was occupied by the British in 1814. The natives wanted to be reunited with the Islands, with which they had been united from 1401 to 1797, for no Christian community would willingly expose itself to the tender mercies of the savage "Lion of Joannina," Ali Pasha, whose treatment of the brave Souliotes and the heroic leap of their women and children from the rock of Zalongo were still fresh in all Epeirote memories. They apparently thought that their wishes had been granted by the British Government, which, in 1815, had expressly renounced the continental dependencies. Accordingly, when Turkey demanded the execution of the treaty of 1800, Maitland proceeded to hand over Parga on the ground that its cession was a treaty right, that no "assurance of a more permanent connection" with Great Britain had been given in 1814, and that the retention of Parga would involve an annual expense of £50,000.

In 1819, however, Parga, which had never known Turkish rule, was the only free Greek community in the world, and this fact, combined with the touching devotion of the inhabitants to their beloved home, aroused an interest out of all proportion to the importance of the place, the exact position of which was so little known to British politicians that two speakers in the debate

at Westminster thought it was an island ! The Parguinotes were informed that they would receive compensation and a free passage to the Ionian Islands, but Maitland greatly reduced the Corfiote valuation of their property, and, although an international treaty enjoined the cession, the substitution of the Turkish for the British flag on "Parga's shore" in 1819 was not an incident upon which either British or Greeks could look with pride. The exiles settled in a suburb of Corfu, and deposited the sacred pictures and other things belonging to their old church at Parga in the garrison-church of that town "until the day when the old home" should "once more be free." That day came during the first Balkan war, when the Greeks captured Parga on January 21, 1913.

The maintenance of neutrality during the War of Independence was a strain upon Ionian loyalty, which was increased when a Greek kingdom arose to exercise a magnetic attraction upon the islanders. But while the long war devastated Greece, the islands profited from the neutral policy of their protector and the losses of their co-nationalists. For the destruction of the Morcote currant-fields doubled those of Cephalonia—an island always the "Achilles' heel" of the protectorate. For the people of that democratic island, where the nobles and the peasants detested each other, and both complained that Britain spent too much money on Corfu, were more enterprising and more

troublesome than the placid descendants of the Phaiakians, whose delicious climate and luxuriant vegetation invite to repose. But the currants of Cephalonia and the sister-islands of Zante and Ithake proved a blessing to the Corfiotes also, for out of the increased revenue which they produced, Maitland's successor, Sir Frederick Adam, was able to make the existing aqueduct and continue his predecessor's policy of material improvements, but no longer by forced labour but by a cattle-tax. Nor were the British benefits merely material. In 1824 a warm Philhellene, who went so far as to be baptized a member of the Orthodox Church, founded an "Ionian Academy" and Lancastrian schools, while the Ionian Government spent a considerable annual sum on education. The natural result was the same as at Athens—the preparation of a generation of critics hostile to the Government; for in Greece education and politics go hand in hand.

Still, except for a few anti-British agitations in Santa Mavra and Zante, there was as yet no strong movement against the protectorate. The administration of Adam's successor, Lord Nugent, a man of Liberal views, encouraged the Liberal party; but the famous Corfiote historian, Mustoxidi, in a memorandum to Lord John Russell, the Colonial Secretary, published in 1841, in consequence of the Conservative system of the next High Commissioner, Sir Howard Douglas, declared independence to be outside the range of

practical politics, agreed that the Ionians would rather be protected by the British than by any other foreigners, and merely demanded Liberal reforms, such as a free press, annual sessions, and a more democratic method of election. Like Maitland, Douglas in his own way benefited the islands: he did much, even at the cost of creating a national debt, for the schools, roads, prisons and the water-supply of Corfu. He was specially popular with the landowners, he laid the foundations of a new code, and made the study of Greek compulsory for British officials. But he came into conflict with the Œcumenical Patriarch, and his seizure of the papers of Mustoxidi and of two members of the Capo d'Istria family (who had inherited the former Greek President's dislike of Great Britain), on suspicion of complicity with the "Phil-Orthodox Society," made him unpopular with others. He was succeeded by a Liberal, Mackenzie, but it was reserved for a Tory peer, Lord Seaton, who followed Mackenzie in 1843, to work a complete revolution in the islands and thus by his drastic reforms to pave the way for their union with Greece.

Occupied at first with roads and agriculture, he was inspired by the spirit of revolution which passed over Europe in 1848, to introduce a free press, to recognize the Assembly's right of voting extraordinary expenditure, and to allow the free election of all municipal authorities, as an instalment of a democratic reform of the Assembly.

A riot, culminating in a peasant rising in Cephalonia, had occurred just before the freedom of the press was permitted, and the publication of numbers of newspapers, mostly directed against the protectorate, fanned the discontent always latent in that island. While Seaton arrested two Cephalonian politicians for a press attack, he disregarded advice from home to advance with Whig caution, and, in 1849, proclaimed the reform of the Constitution of 1817. Henceforth the Assembly, consisting of forty-two members, was to be elected by ballot by an electorate more than tripled; yet the High Commissioner was to nominate the senators from among the members of the Assembly, which was still to be summoned biennially. These intended checks had no effect in preventing what the Ionian democrats and Unionists chiefly sought—a means of declaiming against the protectorate. Both the Assembly and the press were now at their disposal, even though in the first Assembly elected under Seaton's scheme, the "Radicals" were only eleven, while the less advanced "Reformers" formed the majority, and a small "Subterranean" party still advocated the protectorate. But the Radicals, if few, were loud and popular; in Cephalonia they held the majority of the seats; in Zante they were also powerful; in aristocratic Corfu they had little influence. For these reasons some had thought that it might have been wiser to make Cephalonia the official capital. Meanwhile,

Seaton had been succeeded by Sir Henry Ward, who had to face a second peasant rising in that island. The new High Commissioner proclaimed martial law, and some English Liberals were scandalized at the flogging of peasants and the execution of the ringleaders—among them “Father Brigand,” a priest—by one who had been a Liberal Member of Parliament. These Cephalonian insurrections were the only serious disturbances during the half century of British rule; and even they were primarily agrarian rather than anti-British, although the discontent of the peasantry was ably exploited by the Unionist agitators, who belonged to the educated class, and who desired nothing so much as political martyrdom.

It became immediately evident that the Assembly was hard to manage. Well-meaning reforms were blocked by an alliance of the two extreme parties, because the Radicals did not want to lose their grievances and thus jeopardize the Unionist movement, while the “Subterranean” party did not want to lose its privileges. The High Commissioner committed the tactical mistake of catering for the moderate vote at the expense of the nobility and gentry who were devoted supporters of the protectorate, which was thus gradually left with little backing. The anti-Greek policy of Palmerston in the Don Pacifico case and the measures taken against Greece during the Crimean War had an unfavourable effect in the islands, and in Cephalonian schools “a prayer

for the expulsion of the English" was given out as a copybook heading! The foreign press began to depict the benevolently governed Ionian Islands as a Mediterranean Ireland, and the protectors themselves became at last weary of their thankless task. In 1858 a London newspaper published a secret dispatch of the then High Commissioner, Sir John Young, proposing the cession of all the islands to Greece, except Corfu and Paxo, which should be made a British colony. This proposal had the advantage of retaining for Great Britain the islands which had most strategic value, as commanding the mouth of the Adriatic, and were also by far the least disaffected; but its inopportune publication aroused patriotic indignation in the Assembly and embarrassed the great statesman, who was then on his way out to Corfu as "High Commissioner Extraordinary" to the islands—Gladstone.

Gladstone possessed two qualifications which would make him popular with the Ionians—his classical learning and his interest in the Orthodox Church, for he revered a Greek bishop as much as a Greek classic. But he lacked local knowledge, and his offers of reform were met, wherever he went, with demands for union, particularly loud in Cephalonia, but expressed, though with less vehemence, in Zante, the stronghold of the Radical politician, Lombardos, who was Britain's leading opponent in the islands. Undaunted by this reception, the great parliamentarian offered, and

was appointed, to succeed Young as temporary High Commissioner for the purpose of laying his scheme of reform before the Assembly. The Assembly replied with a vote for union; their motion, transformed into a petition to the Home Government, was rejected, and he introduced a sweeping diminution of the Civil Service and proposed to halve the deputies' salaries—reforms economically sound, but politically unwise, because they further embittered the Radicals and simultaneously alienated those vested interests which were the mainstay of the protectorate. While his scheme was still under discussion he had hastily to leave for home, while Sir Henry Knight Storks, who was destined to be the last High Commissioner, had to meet a situation still further injured by the Gladstonian mission, and soon made worse by the Italian war against Austria. For not only had Corfu sheltered Italian exiles, but the public utterances of British statesmen in favour of Italy's right to self-determination were quoted inconveniently by Ionians as logically applicable to themselves.

Gladstone from his place in Parliament still defended the protectorate, but in 1862 it had already been decided to give up the islands, and the Queen's speech of 1863 made union contingent on the Ionians' desire for it—a desire too often expressed to be uncertain to those who knew the real feelings of the politicians. Accordingly, the treaty of 1863, which fixed the conditions of King

George's accession, pledged the British to cede the islands if the Ionian Parliament desired, and the Powers consented to a revision of the treaty of 1815 in this sense. But there were certain local conditions—the preservation of the British cemeteries, an annual charge on the Ionian treasury of £10,000 for the new King, the payment of certain pensions by the Greek Government, the abandonment of various Ionian claims, and (at the wish of Austria and Turkey) the neutralization of Corfu and Paxo and the destruction of certain of the Corfiote forts. These last two conditions caused much criticism, but the neutrality of Corfu has been useful to Greece as an argument against the modern Italian claim that the channel between that island and the mainland might become a naval station threatening the Adriatic. On June 2, 1864, Thrasyboulos Zaïmes formally received the islands in the name of King George.

While the union of the islands was an unmixed gain to Greece, whom it provided with politicians and diplomatists of a more finished culture than was then common on the mainland, it was differently viewed by the Ionians, or rather by the Corfiotes, who lost most by the withdrawal of the British garrison and officials, according as it was considered from a national or a material standpoint. The poor Greek Government did not, and could not, spend upon the islands what the British had spent. Roads fell into disrepair, the gaiety of Corfiote society ceased, money no longer

circulated, and comfortable official jobs were no longer common at Corfu. Corfiote titles of nobility, accepted by the British, aroused a smile in democratic Athens. In place of a constantly resident and highly-paid High Commissioner, his Corfiote villa of *Mon Repos* was rarely tenanted by King George. But these disadvantages were outweighed by ethnological and national considerations, and the profit was shared by Great Britain. Her rule had not, and could not have been, a success, although no other foreign Power—and least of all some of her autocratic critics—could have governed better. There was in the latter days of the protectorate a lack of sympathy between the governed and their protectors; social intercourse between them became rarer; and while the British became more aggressively British, the Ionians felt themselves more Greek. The cession of the islands serves as several historic lessons: it proclaimed in the face of an egoistic world the altruism of Great Britain; it served to the Greeks as a stepping-stone for the union with Crete; it may be a warning to the Italians that, if the British, admittedly past-masters in the art of governing foreign dependencies, failed by material benefits to succeed in quenching the national aspirations of the Greeks in Corfu and Cyprus, they cannot hope to succeed in the Dodekanese. National gratitude is a doubtful quantity; but a possible foreign ally is better than a discontented foreign subject.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CRETAN QUESTION (1864-9)

THE eighty-four Ionian deputies elected to the National Assembly at Athens arrived in time to participate in the long-drawn discussion of the new Greek Constitution. Months wore on, and at last the King intimated that, if Greece were not speedily provided with a Constitution, he might return to Denmark. The pace was thereupon quickened ; as usually happens in parliamentary debates, the last articles were hurried through the Assembly ; and before November was over, the King had taken the oath to the new Constitution, the second since Greece had become a kingdom, the sixth since the War of Independence began. With a few alterations it governed Greece for forty-six years.

The Constitution of 1864 began by abolishing the Senate, and thencefore Greece has had no second chamber. The Othonian Senate had not justified its existence, and in a country (with the exception of the Ionian Islands) so democratic and at that time so poor, an aristocratic or plutocratic second chamber would have been impossible.

It was, indeed, attempted to have some check upon the Chamber in the shape of a Council of State of some fifteen or twenty persons, such as Otho had had in the early part of his reign ; but this proposal, adopted by a small majority, was abolished by the next legislature, for the section of the Constitution which included it was alone liable to immediate revision, while the lapse of ten years, a largely supported demand in two successive legislatures and a revisionary Chamber of twice the ordinary number of deputies were essential to the revision of the rest. Thus, Greece was committed to an unchecked, omnipotent, single Chamber, a pure democracy, tempered only by the fact that in all forms of Government, autocratic, oligarchic or democratic, in practice the real power is usually concentrated in the hands of a few persons. Still, no country probably presented so clear an example of parliamentarism as Greece between 1864 and 1910. The *Boulé* was elected by manhood suffrage and the ballot for four years, in proportion to the population. But the historic services of the "Nautical Islands" gained special representation for the inhabitants of Hydra, Spetsai and New Psara. Obstruction was made easy by fixing the quorum at one more than half the total number of deputies, which varied at different periods between 150 and 234. Abstention could, therefore, bring business to a standstill, and accordingly the Constitution of 1911 reduced the quorum to one-third. The

Italian practice of making thirty the earliest age for election as deputies encouraged experience at the expense of enthusiasm; their further restriction to natives or residents in their respective constituencies favoured local men and at times excluded statesmen of European reputation. The admission as deputies of naval and military officers tended to sacrifice discipline to politics. Payment of members was inevitable; a less desirable feature was the custom of making the civil service, instead of being permanent, largely depend upon Ministerial crises. This turned practically every one into a political meteorologist, for upon the political barometer at Athens might depend the future of himself or his friends. Cabinets came and went rapidly, to the detriment of continuous administration, but to the great interest of the people, who regard politics as the most fascinating of pursuits, and even that most constitutional sovereign, King George, dismissed in his all but fifty years' reign six Ministries, which had not been made by the Chamber to resign.

One or two Ionian questions caused difficulties. The Ionians wanted political union with Greece, but ecclesiastical union (which they had retained under the protectorate) with the Patriarch at Constantinople; some of them opposed the immediate introduction of an uniform fiscal system. In the latter they were successful; the Patriarch was induced to abandon his Ionian

jurisdiction to the Metropolitan of Athens ; the Ionian Church was finally united to that of Greece in 1866, but the existing Metropolitan of Corfu was allowed to continue the use of that title.

Scarcely had the Ionian question been settled and the new Constitution put into operation than a fresh disturbing force diverted attention to foreign politics in the shape of a great Cretan insurrection. Crete had had an even longer experience of foreign domination than Corfu ; like Corfu, it had been Venetian for over four centuries ; unlike Corfu, it had then been Turkish for nearly two. Its history under the first 160 years of Venetian rule had been an almost constant record of insurrections ; under the Turks it had been complicated by the fact that the Cretan Moslems were of the same Greek race as the Cretan Christians, and, as is usually the case with renegades, more fanatical than those born in the religion usually associated with their nationality. The Sphakiotes, who occupied much the same position in Turkish Crete as the Mainates in Turkish Greece, had long alone enjoyed practical independence, but even they had paid the capitation tax after 1770. Soon after the outbreak of the War of Independence, which had at first aroused little excitement in Crete, they rose against the Turks, after massacres at Canca and Candia ; a *Harmostés* was sent from Greece to govern the island ; but Egyptian troops combined with the indiscipline of the Sphakiotes to crush the insurrection. It ended in smoke—

the smoke which suffocated the wretched Christians in the cavern, where they had taken refuge.

A second Cretan insurrection, organized by refugees on the islet of Graboûsa, the old Venetian stronghold, which had remained in the hands of the Republic for twenty-two years after the Turkish conquest of "the great Greek island," broke out after the battle of Navarino, under the leadership of Hadji Michales, only to end in failure. Crete sent delegates to the National Assembly of Argos in 1829, but in 1830 was united to Egypt under Mehemet Ali, as payment for the services rendered by him to the Sultan during the war. The Cretans were, however, to have the right of free navigation, their own flag, and their own tax-collectors in the persons of their bishops and captains. This unnatural union with Egypt lasted for only ten years; in 1840, the revolt of Mehemet Ali from his sovereign was punished by the retrocession of Crete to Turkey, as one of the conditions on which he was to have the hereditary Viceroyalty of Egypt. The Egyptian rule had been unpopular with Christian and Moslem Cretans alike; for the Christians disliked the Egyptians because they wanted to be joined with Greece, while the Moslems disliked them because they wanted to rule the island, as they had under the almost nominal authority of the Sultan's representative. Of the two opposing parties, the Christians had suffered less from the Egyptian connexion, for they were more favoured than the

Moslems by their Egyptian governors, one of whom proclaimed his policy to be their deliverance from their former vexations. They were to have only two taxes; justice was to be administered by two mixed councils. But Mehemet, whose government of Egypt was based upon monopolies, soon increased the number of the taxes and tampered with the work of the councils; he alarmed the landowners by threatening to confiscate all land left uncultivated for three years—a measure which would have made him the landlord of much of the island's cultivable area, for the population had sunk in twelve years to only 129,000, whereas it had consisted of 160,000 Moslems and 130,000 Christians at the outbreak of the insurrection of 1821.

While the Cretan Moslems asked for redress, the Cretan Christians agitated for union; a "Central Committee," was started in Greece, and in 1841, a fresh insurrection, started by the Sphakiotes, began with no better success than its predecessors. For the next seventeen years the island was quiet; but in 1858, the Cretans threatened to rise, if the reforms promised remained, like most Turkish reforms—a dead letter. Again the motives of the Cretans were mixed: among the Christians the wish for either union or a Cretan principality, whose prince should be the famous Kallerges, whose family had long been connected with Cretan revolutions; among Christians and Moslems alike the fear of further

taxation, foreshadowed by a census—never a popular institution in the East. The taxes were, as a matter of fact, neither heavy nor numerous, but the example of Hampden shows that when mankind wishes for a revolution, even a small tax may serve as the occasion.

The Porte, as usual, pursued a dilatory policy ; it promised, thereby merely delaying the outbreak of discontent, which maladministration and two bad crops increased. Accordingly, in 1866, a fresh agitation among the Christians became serious. In its origin this movement was likewise fiscal, for the Christians' petition to the Sultan referred primarily to the increase on various articles of consumption, notably salt, since 1858. They drew attention to the usual Turkish neglect of all means of communication within the island—a neglect which continued down to the end of its connexion with Turkey ; they demanded a rural bank, which should lend money at reasonable interest ; they complained that the judgments of the courts were given in Turkish, to them a foreign language, that a Moslem's word in the witness-box outweighed that of a Christian, and that schools were lacking. The Porte first delayed, and then refused to remit taxes, thus giving the party of action in both Crete and Athens time to influence the others. The Porte, which by this time, like most of their foreign rulers, had found the Cretans as hard to govern as England found the Irish, then reverted to the policy of 1830,

and meditated the reunion of Crete with Egypt, indeed, the Egyptians offered to concede several of the points in the Cretan petition, if the Cretans would join them. The Cretan reply was the abolition of Ottoman rule in an Assembly held at Sphakia, and the proclamation of union with Greece, despite the warnings of Lord Clarendon and the lessons which he drew from the material results of the union of the Ionian Islands, as if Turkish rule were comparable to the British protectorate.

This insurrection, which lasted till 1869, was much more serious than those above mentioned. The Cretans are the best fighters of all the Greeks ; they have the redoubled love of both highlanders and islanders for independence, and their mountainous island is an extremely difficult country to subdue. Greece was intensely interested in their struggle for union, and there were a number of Cretans at Athens who kept up public excitement. But the Greek Government, warned by the example of 1854, remained nominally neutral, looking on while volunteers embarked for Crete, although Koumoundouros, when Premier, as befitted an old insurgent of 1841, prepared for war. The insurgents, whose chiefs were Zymbrakakes, a Cretan officer in the Greek army, and Koronaïos, the commander of the Greek national guard, met with varying fortunes, but the heroism of Maneses, the Abbot of Arkadion, who blew up the powder-magazine rather than surrender his monastery

to the Turks, and the massacre which followed greatly assisted the Cretan cause abroad and strained Greek neutrality almost to breaking-point. Meanwhile, of the Powers, Great Britain alone opposed the French proposal for a Cretan *plébiscite*; France and Russia, in 1867, openly advocated union, in the real interest of Turkey, as well as of Crete, for the island was an useless encumbrance and a source of trouble to the Turkish Empire. For the second time union was postponed, with the result of further insurrections, and the postponement of a final settlement till 1912.

The course of the insurrection was marked by alternate attempts at conciliation on the part of the Porte and atrocities, such as those which had been perpetrated in 1823. One general destroyed 600 villages, but his campaign cost him over 20,000 men. Military measures having failed, the "Organic Statute of 1868," which governed the island till 1878, was compiled to pacify the insurgents. Crete, divided into five provinces, was provided with a *váli*, two Assessors (one a Christian), and a mixed Council of Administration; Greek and Turkish were both to be official languages; a General Assembly was to meet annually at Canea, and there were to be no fresh taxes. Despite the "Organic Statute," however, the provisional government continued the languishing struggle with no decisive result for either side. But the departure of the Mainate

chief, Petropoulakes, from Athens with fresh volunteers, provoked a Turkish ultimatum to Greece and nearly anticipated the Greco-Turkish War of 1897. As Gladstone simultaneously became Prime Minister, the Greeks hoped that he would advocate the union of Crete as he had helped the union of the Ionian Islands. Kou-moundouros, then in opposition, urged the Government to war, while the presence of many Cretan refugees in Athens embarrassed it further. Its reply to the ultimatum was such that the Turkish Minister left, and the situation became daily more critical. Then Bismarck stepped in with the proposal of a Conference in Paris of the signatories of the treaty of 1856, which had ended the Crimean War. Both Greece and Turkey accepted a declaration that Greece would allow neither armed bands nor armed vessels for the purpose of aggression against Turkey.

Thus the Cretan question, soluble in 1867, was in 1869 left unsolved ; the Cretan insurrection died of inanition, a Liberal governor-general was sent to the island and diplomatists fondly hoped that a formula had quieted Crete. One disastrous result of this Cretan insurrection was the lesson which it impressed upon Turkish statesmen that their wisest policy was to separate the Greeks from their other Christian subjects by establishing a separate Bulgarian Church. For since the fall of the Bulgarian Patriarchate, the seat of which was Trnovo, the capital of the mediæval Bulgarian

Empire, in 1394, the Bulgarians had been under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Œcumenical Patriarch. Thus the Turks had governed their bodies, the Greeks had looked after their souls—a labour which, in the Near East, is apt to be regarded as a branch of political propaganda. But, in 1870, a firman was issued, at the instigation of Ignatyeff, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, creating a Bulgarian Exarchate, which comprised nearly all the Turkish *vilâyet* of the Danube, and extending the Exarch's jurisdiction over such other districts as might welcome it by a two-thirds' majority. The Œcumenical Patriarch in vain for two years delayed the nomination of the first Exarch, whom he regarded much as a mediæval Pope regarded an anti-Pope. When all else failed, he excommunicated the Exarch and his clergy as schismatics.

Unhappily, the conflict was not limited to these purely spiritual weapons. From that moment there were sown the seeds of the Macedonian question, which was to become the curse of a once flourishing region and the riddle of European diplomacy. The creation of a Bulgarian principality in 1878 increased the struggle. Rival Governments at Sofia and Athens intrigued at Constantinople, where the Exarch took up his residence cheek by jowl with his rival, the Patriarch, for the bestowal of every vacant Macedonian bishopric upon a divine of their own race, who, when appointed, became an ardent nationalist

propagandist. As is usual in the Balkans, propaganda soon took the form of physical violence. Armed bands made Macedonia a desert, and peasants, described as Exarchists and Patriarchists, killed their brethren of the Orthodox or "Schismatic" fold with more zest than if they had been Turks. Meanwhile, the Turks had gained their object—that of dividing the Christian forces. When, as in 1912, those forces were united against the Turks, the Balkan Christians were irresistible; when, as in 1897, they were disunited, the Turks won an easy victory. *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*. Other non-Hellenic races, fired by the success of the Bulgarians, began to agitate for separate Churches of their own—the Serbians for the restoration of their historic Patriarchate of Petch (Ipek); the Roumanians for a Roumanian establishment. At present, there is a movement for an independent Albanian Church, with the object of undermining Hellenism in South Albania. Thus, judged by its results, the Bulgarian Exarchate was the worst blow which Hellenism received during the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER VII

THE EASTERN CRISIS OF 1876 TO 1886

THE seven years following the conclusion of the Cretan insurrection were mainly occupied with internal affairs. In 1869, a most important event occurred—the opening of the first Greek railway, that uniting the capital with the Piræus. From this modest beginning dates the now fairly extended railway system which has done so much to improve internal communications in a difficult country. Otho's reign had been the golden age of the Greek sailing vessel, but communication by water, for which the configuration of the indented coast and the many islands make Greece most suitable, was at this date comparatively seldom effected by means of steamers, which in 1875 numbered only twenty-eight. Since those days, however, both the number of the steamers and the mileage of the railways have enormously increased. In 1915, before foreign sales and submarine warfare had diminished their number, there were 474 Greek steamers, mostly belonging to certain families, with a tonnage of 549,983 tons—a total reduced to 204, with 161,522 tons in 1919, as the result of the

war. In 1912, before her aggrandizement, "Old" Greece had 986 miles of railways. It was one of the merits of Trikoupes to develop the railway system. A girdle of rails was put round the Peloponnese; a disconnected line was built in the North-West, from Kryoneri to Agrinion; a local line joined Athens with the mines of Lavrion; railway construction was easy in the great plain of Thessaly after the annexation of that province in 1881; but the greatest of all Greek railway enterprises, the connexion with the rest of Europe by rail, was a long and arduous affair, delayed by economic and political obstacles. The nucleus of this trunk line, the Piræus-Larissa railway, was begun in 1890, but the first section, including the branch to Chalkis, was not opened till 1904. Even after Thessaly had at last been connected by this railway with the Piræus, instead of being only accessible by steamer to Volo, the Turks hindered the much-desired junction with the Macedonian system, and thereby with "Europe," for strategic reasons. When, after 1912, Greece annexed South Macedonia, that obstacle disappeared; a junction was finally effected in 1916, and an "Akropolis" express now runs through from Paris to the Piræus.

Hitherto, Athens had had no daily post from "Europe," and Greece had been as much isolated, so far as railway traffic was concerned, as Dalmatia, Montenegro or Albania, and in a far inferior position to the other Balkan states. The

Greeks hope that this through route to the East will supplant that by Brindisi, besides facilitating a lucrative tourist traffic, from which Greece should derive considerable revenue. For that end the construction of more "European" hotels in country towns is needed; for the modern traveller is usually no explorer, and shrinks from the *khan*, which sheltered his hardier predecessor, less sensitive to nocturnal pinpricks as he lay on his live mattress on the hard floor. In recent years, motors, of which the first was introduced in 1901, have supplemented railways, and Sparta is thus easily accessible from the Peloponnesian line. Let us hope that these greater conveniences will not rob Greece of its unique charms of scenery, its unrivalled hospitality and the old-world atmosphere which lingers round its mediæval sites. It should be the aim of the Greeks in this matter to combine progress with the picturesque.

Another barrier to travel in Greece received its death-blow in 1870, owing to the stir created by the seizure of Lord Muncaster and his party by brigands at Pikermi, near Marathon, and the murder of some of the prisoners. The Balkan peninsula had been from time immemorial the happy hunting-ground of brigands, for the country is mountainous, the peasantry was often friendly, and after every war a number of soldiers would take to the hills. The stir made by the Marathon affair was enormous, and the British public became violently excited against Greece, although

only two of the twenty-one brigands were Greeks, and brigandage had diminished during the six years preceding the revolution of 1862, but had blossomed forth again as the result of the anarchy during the interregnum. But this sad affair produced good in the end. Vigorous measures were taken against brigandage ; no foreigner has been captured since 1870, and the last case of the murder of a Greek by brigands was nearly thirty years ago.

A question as to the right of an Italo-French company to extract ore from the refuse of the ancient mines at Lavrion, where it had bought land in 1864, led to a chauvinist agitation, the nationalization of these spoil-banks, and an Italo-French protest against this action. There followed one of those constitutional questions dear to parliamentarians, owing to the alleged violation of the charter of 1864 by Boulgares, the Premier, as to the interpretation of the legal quorum of the Chamber. The Cabinet was impeached, and two Ministers convicted of bribery in connexion with church appointments. These party struggles were not a very suitable preparation for the greatest crisis in the Eastern question that had arisen since the Crimean War, that which began with the insurrection in the Herzegovina in 1875 and led up to the resettlement of the Balkan peninsula by the Berlin treaty of 1878. In that crisis Greece played a subordinate part ; she did not declare war upon Turkey, like Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro ; she was not immediately

benefited as were the Bulgarians ; but she subsequently obtained her second accession of territory. The Greeks looked on with indifference at the Herzegovinian and Bulgarian risings and the early efforts of the two Serb states : those people were Slavs, and there was little or no sympathy between them and the Hellenes. When, however, the blessed word “ autonomy ” began to be murmured in connexion with Bosniaks and Bulgars, public opinion in Greece awoke to the fact that the word was of Greek origin, and that there were Greek provinces of Turkey to which it might be applicable.

In 1877, a situation rather like that of 1854 arose at Athens, with the entry of Russia into the struggle against Turkey. Private jealousies and party quarrels were silenced, and the veteran Admiral Kanares assumed the presidency of an “ Œcumenical,” or Coalition Government, in which four ex-Premiers also sat. The “ Œcumenical ” Government, whose Foreign Minister was Trikoupes, declined to follow the advice of those hotheads who wanted, as in 1854, to stir up Thessaly and Epeiros to revolt ; its policy was to trust the British Cabinet for adequate compensation in due time for Greece’s “ correct ” attitude at this crisis. Consequently this Ministry refused to join Russia in the war. But when the Russians were known to be on the way to Adrianople, with Constantinople as their objective, the cry arose for war. The “ Œcumenical ” Government made way for a war Cabinet under Kou-

moundouros, whose Foreign Minister was Theodore Deligiannes, later identified with the war scare of 1886, and the war of 1897. Insurrections were started in the Greek provinces of Turkey, which the Government announced its intention of "occupying provisionally." But before the Greek troops had reached the frontier, the Russo-Turkish armistice was signed, and it was too late. The Government recalled the army; the Epeirote insurrection collapsed, but insurgent committees, which had their seats in the poetic mountains of Pelion and Olympos held out, and it required British intervention and promises of goodwill before the Thessalians would lay down their arms. British mediation ended, too, the insurrection which broke out in Crete in 1878, in consequence of the Porte's refusals to modify the "Organic Statute" of 1868. A Cretan Assembly had asked for Autonomy, on payment of a tribute; and, as the Porte did not reply, the islanders appealed to arms; but on neither side was there the vehemence of the previous rising. Finally, the Porte promised "in concert with England" to "make arrangements for a new form of Government for Crete." This promise was not kept, and the result later on was further bloodshed.

The treaty of San Stefano, which would have created a big Bulgaria, was received by the Greeks with just protests, addressed to the British Government, against this flagrant sacrifice, in Russian interest, of the Hellenic element in Macedonia

and Thrace to the Bulgarian. The Beaconsfield Cabinet, more anxious to repulse Russian influence than to enlarge Greece, found that its interests and those of the Greeks coincided, and replied that it was "prepared to exert all its influence to prevent the absorption into a Slav state of any Greek population." British opposition caused the treaty of San Stefano to be torn up; for it was substituted that of Berlin. Salisbury in vain advocated the admission of Greece to the Congress, but it was decided that the Greek delegates, of whom one was Deligiannes, should be only heard, but should have no vote. Even Deligiannes limited the Greek claims to the annexation of Crete and those Turkish provinces—Thessaly and Epeiros—which marched with the Greek frontier, and he pointed out that their cession would promote what every one desired—the peace of the East.

The Congress, as usual, adopted a compromise, and even that compromise was not immediately effected. Crete was to remain Turkish, on the promise of the Porte to apply the "Organic Statute" of 1868, and Macedonia, Thrace and the larger part of Epeiros were to be endowed with an administration based on that unsatisfactory Cretan model. In both cases the promise was unperformed, and the disgusted Cretan Christians begged, if they could not have union, for a British protectorate, like the Cypriotes. At the suggestion of Salisbury, who was a true friend of Greece, and on the proposal of the French dele-

gate, the Porte was invited to move the Northern Greek frontier up to the rivers Peneios on the east and Kalamas on the west, thus ceding Thessaly and Epeiros, as far as a point on the mainland opposite the south of Corfu, to Greece. This was all that Greece received at Berlin, beyond advice from Beaconsfield that she had a future, and could afford to wait.

Three years passed before even a part of the promised territory was assigned to her. For the Turks, past-masters in the art of procrastination, raised one obstacle after the other to the new frontier. Their military experts, as is the way with military experts, declared that the suggested line was not a strategic frontier; their useful supporters against Slavs and Greeks, the Albanians, gave signs of a national conscience for the first time since the death of Skanderbeg, and an "Albanian League" arose to contest the Greek claims to Southern Epeiros. Petitions from both races filled the waste-paper baskets of the Foreign Office.

As the conference of the Greco-Turkish Commission at Preveza proved abortive, the scene was changed to Constantinople, with like result, although Salisbury again intervened on behalf of Greece, reminding the Porte that the defective frontier of 1832 had been "rather a source of weakness than of strength to the Sultan" and the cause of brigandage to the detriment of both states. Matters dragged on till the advent of Gladstone to power in 1880 led to a fresh con-

ference at Berlin, where the Anglo-French proposal drew the Greek frontier from the crest of Olympos to the mouth of the Kalamas; thus Joannina would have been in Greek territory. Unfortunately, a Ministerial crisis in France led to a change of her foreign policy. Turkey immediately, as always, availed herself of the disunion of the Powers to adopt an obstinate attitude; Greece armed; neither party to the issue would accept arbitration.

The final settlement was reached in 1881 by another conference at Constantinople, but only between the Porte and the delegates of the Powers, in which, therefore, Greece had no direct voice, although Goschen, the British delegate, tried hard to obtain for her the line of Olympos on the east and Preveza on the west. Instead, the Turks actually offered Crete with a slight rectification of the land frontier and "a few little islands." But the Greeks refused this offer, and the Cretans, with admirable self-sacrifice in the interests of Hellenism as a whole, acquiesced therein. For it was felt that Crete, racially a Greek island, must inevitably one day come to Greece, whereas an increase of territory in the direction of Macedonia and Albania was more urgent, for in those regions there were rival races with claims of their own. This offer having been rejected, it became evident that the Turks would not cede the Kalamas line, but would fight rather than relinquish Preveza, which commands the entrance to the Ambrakian gulf and is the port of Joannina. As

Greece could not fight, and the Powers would not put forcible pressure upon Turkey, a fresh compromise was made by the convention of May 24, 1881, which fixed the Greek frontier a little north of the classic vale of Tempe, through which so many invaders had entered the rich plain of Thessaly. The river of Arta became the Greek boundary on the west. Thus Greece obtained nearly the whole of Thessaly—an enormous gain, owing to its agricultural value—but in Epeiros only the district of Arta, the town which, after the Frankish conquest, had been one of the few refuges of Hellenism.

The settlement of 1881, which lasted, with a slight strategic modification in favour of Turkey in 1898, down to 1912, was admittedly less than Greece deserved. An arrangement, which excluded Olympos from Greece and compelled the people of Arta to cross the famous bridge into Turkish territory whenever they visited their farms, was geographically and economically absurd; but it was a strategic advantage for Greece to have Punta, which faces Preveza on the other side of the Gulf, and which had been refused her in 1832. Even then the Turks refused to give up the defile of Karalik-Dervend, near which the eastern frontier terminated, and fighting took place there in 1882, till a mixed commission finally bestowed it upon Greece. Such labour had it required to fix her Northern frontier. It had been a costly operation to the Greek treasury, for to face the Eastern crisis two loans, involving

a heavy deficit, and a paper currency had been necessary, while Greece had to assume her proportion of the Ottoman debt for the new provinces. She pledged herself to respect the religion and religious endowments of the Moslems, who in Thessaly were large landowners. The promise was kept; but the Moslem cares not to live under the rule of the *Giaour*, especially when that *Giaour* has been his own *râyah*. Consequently, from Thessaly, as from Eubœa fifty years earlier, as from Macedonia thirty years later, there was a large Moslem emigration; the large estates came into the market; and, with the advantages incident upon the acquisition of Thessaly, Greece inherited a land question, which M. Venizelos endeavoured to solve.

Crete, which had nobly sacrificed herself for the general good, had obtained in 1878 an improvement on the "Organic Statute" in the shape of the Pact of Halepa—the suburb of Canea. This Pact became the charter of the island, and was more favourable to the Christians than any previous Turkish reform. It established a Governor-General (who for several years was a Greek subject of Turkey), with an Assessor of the opposite religion, and an annual General Assembly of forty-nine Christians and thirty-one Moslems; it proclaimed the freedom of the press, made Greek the official language of the law-courts and the legislature; and ear-marked half the surplus revenue for those local improvements, notably roads and harbours, which the island sorely needed, and which 209

years of Turkish rule had failed to supply. Union remained the ideal of the Christians, but after the Pact of Halepa they were more contented than the Moslems, and there was no insurrection till 1889.

Another Greek island had meanwhile passed for ever from the direct dominion of Turkey. On June 4, 1878, a few days before the Berlin Congress met, Beaconsfield had concluded the Cyprus Convention with Turkey, which, on payment of an annual tribute, allowed Great Britain to occupy and administer that island as "a place of arms," the better to enable her to execute her pledge to defend Asiatic Turkey against further Russian encroachments, in return for which aid the Sultan promised "to introduce necessary reforms," for the benefit of the Armenians, in concert with the British Government. Should Russia abandon her recent conquests in Asia, Britain would quit Cyprus. There was at the moment much talk about Cyprus in the British press; its acquisition was considered by some as a great diplomatic triumph, and Richard I's conquest of the island in 1191 from its local Greek "Emperor" was unearthed as a historical precedent for the British occupation. Since then Cyprus had never been Greek. Richard had sold it to the Templars; the Templars, unable to manage it, handed it back to Richard, who sold it, in 1192, to Guy de Lusignan, ex-King of Jerusalem; Guy founded the dynasty which ruled it, till, in 1489, it became a Venetian colony, absorbed in Turkey in 1571.

At the outset the Turks were welcomed as a relief from the Latins by the Orthodox Greek population; they restored the Orthodox Archbishopric and abolished serfdom. But their maladministration was the same as everywhere, and oppressed the peasants, Christian and Moslem alike; their local government was constantly changing, while the Orthodox Archbishop became all-powerful, till in the year of the outbreak of the Greek insurrection he and his three suffragans were murdered.

A British Vice-Consular report of 1867 depicts the decline of Cyprus under Turkish rule. Consequently it was not much of an asset materially when the British took it in charge, while naval opinion held that, if a base were wanted in the Levant, the small Turkish island of Astypalaia (now occupied by Italy), with its two fine harbours, would be preferable. It certainly would have been less expensive; for the annual tribute was foolishly based upon the average surplus of the five previous years, which amounted to £92,800, regardless of the fact that the Turks had obtained this large surplus upon a total revenue of £147,281 by their usual practice of spending little upon public works, whereas the British had to begin everything from the beginning. Besides, in 1882, nearly £82,000 of the tribute were set aside to pay the bondholders of the Turkish loan of 1855.

As long as the tribute existed it was a great handicap to the progress of Cyprus and a burden to the British Exchequer, obliged to make up the

resultant deficits in the insular budget. But when the late war between Great Britain and Turkey broke out, Cyprus was, on November 5, 1914, annexed, and the payment of tribute ceased. Turkey renounced in the treaty of Sèvres all rights to both island and tribute. The annexation was specially welcomed by the Cypriote Christians because it would enable Britain to dispose freely of their destinies, whereas hitherto the official British argument in reply to repeated Cypriote demands for union with Greece had been that, if Britain left Cyprus, it would be her duty under the convention to restore it, as she restored Parga, to Turkey. She did actually offer to cede Cyprus to Greece in October 7, 1915, if the latter "would give full and immediate support to Serbia." But the Zaïmes Cabinet did not see its way to give such support, whereupon Sir E. Grey stated that the offer had lapsed. It has not been renewed,—indeed, on May 9, 1916, the Sykes-Picot agreement pledged Britain not to cede Cyprus without France's consent—although M. Venizelos was willing to meet the strategic arguments of the British military authorities by allowing them an aviation base on the island should it be ceded to Greece. Its strategic value, diminished after the occupation of Egypt in 1882, is said to have increased since the British occupation of Palestine and the other changes upon the coast of Asia Minor and Syria, and Greek desire for union was enhanced by the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement of

1919, which pledged Italy to hold a *plébiscite* in Rhodes if Britain should cede Cyprus to Greece. This agreement has, however, been disavowed by Italy on the ground that the treaty of Sèvres, with which it was to enter simultaneously into force, has been revised.

The Cypriote Christians, who form the vast majority of the population, while admitting the justice and material advantages of British rule, desire, like the Ionians, union with their less well-administered motherland, and for the same racial reason. The Constitution, granted in 1882, like the Ionian Constitution of 1849, has provided them with a platform for their propaganda; the episcopacy, as is usual, leads the Unionist Movement, which is opposed by the Moslem minority. Strategic reasons may delay, but history will doubtless record, the inevitable solution of this question. If it be long delayed, the Greeks of Athens have themselves to blame for rejecting the offer of 1915, for to nations, as to individuals, such opportunities rarely recur.

A lull in Greek affairs occurred between the settlement of the Northern frontier and the next war scare in 1885. Greek politics at this period became largely a personal question between two men, each remarkable in his way, the one as a statesman of the first rank, the other an unrivalled parliamentarian, the Kolettēs of modern times. Trikoupes, "the Englishman," had broader views, but less local knowledge; Deligiannes pandered to the chauvinistic feelings of the people without

always considering whether there was adequate force behind Nationalism. Trikoupes worked hard to improve the financial situation, and succeeded, by increasing the taxes, in ridding Greece of the paper currency. But economy, popular in the abstract, makes a Minister enemies in a democratic country ; so, unfortunately, the Jingo Deligiannes was in power when, in 1885, the Union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria by the Philippopolis Revolution, and the consequent aggrandizement of Bulgaria, aroused the war party alike at Belgrade and Athens, where the balance of power in the Balkans was declared to be endangered, unless Bulgaria's two rivals received territorial compensation. Some Ministers proposed a naval expedition to support the Cretans, who had again proclaimed union with Greece, and the occupation of the Kalamas line in Epeiros, thus making Turkey pay for the act of Bulgaria.

Greece did not, however, like Serbia, go to war ; but the Bulgarian defeat of the Serbians at Slivnitza had a great repercussion upon her. Demonstrations were held, and Deligiannes disregarded the warnings alike of Salisbury and of his Liberal successor, Lord Rosebery. In vain the Powers unanimously told him to disarm and that they could not permit a naval attack upon Turkey, such as he seemed to contemplate. His reply was to go on arming and to demand, not without reason, that as Bulgaria was to be allowed to keep Eastern Roumelia, Greece should have the

frontier which had been promised to her. The Powers, except France, who declined to join in putting pressure upon Greece, then sent a note to Deligiannes, requesting him peremptorily to disarm, and, as their request was not fulfilled, on May 8, 1886, blockaded the Greek coast. Thus, for the second time, a British squadron was engaged in a Greek blockade, and on this occasion its commander was that same Duke of Edinburgh who, as Prince Alfred, had been the elect of the Greek people twenty-three years earlier, and who, but for the refusal of the British Government, might have been blockaded instead of blockading. The resignation of Deligiannes followed, when all the harm had been done, large deficits had been incurred and the paper currency reintroduced, and the pacific Trikoupes soon returned with the mission of repairing his bellicose rival's mistakes. Fortunately, the actual fighting was confined to a few frontier skirmishes, the new Cabinet disarmed and the blockade was raised after lasting for nearly a month.

Greece gained nothing by this attitude of Ajax defying the lightning. If she lost no territory she had to bear the loss of a forced currency for many years, while the lesson of 1886 was lost upon Deligiannes, who eleven years later repeated, with far graver results, his warlike policy. For the time, however, the long Eastern crisis ended, and Greece enjoyed the advantage of repose from the excitement of foreign policy.

CHAPTER VIII

ECONOMICS, CRETE AND THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR (1886-98)

ECONOMIC questions were the chief concern of Greece for nearly nine years after the blockade of 1886. This was the period of railway extension and of other public works; it was in 1893 that the attempt of Nero, the prophecy of Apollonius of Tyana, and the dream of Lucan, "to save ships from rounding long Cape Malca," was at last accomplished by the cutting of the Corinth Canal. Unfortunately, the canal was not made sufficiently wide, while the strong current rendered navigation difficult. But it has proved a great saving of time for those steamers which use it and much diminished the all-sea route from Brindisi. This rapid transit has, however, injured Corinth, which was the natural stopping-place for those who traversed the Isthmus. While Athens and the Piræus are flourishing modern towns, while Aigion and Patras are the outlets of the currant-trade, Corinth, once so famous for wealth and luxury, has now none but archæological interest.

There were, however, checks to economic progress

during those peaceful years, culminating in the financial crisis of 1893 and a subsequent currant crisis, which caused a currency crisis in the winter of 1894-5, when the exchange went up to 187½. The currant crisis derived its origin from the time when the phylloxera in France had created a great demand for these serviceable berries, which are mentioned as having been cultivated in the Morea in the fourteenth century, but were not grown in quantities for the consumption of Northern Europe until after the Turkish reconquest of the Morea in the eighteenth. The currant has, like the grape-vine, not been an unmixed benefit to mankind. At first, the French demand for all the currants that Greece could send her raised prices and brought money into the country. Thereupon, the peasants, thinking that the demand would last for ever, cut down their olive-trees, cut up their pasture-land (just as the Italians have sacrificed the olive-trees of Bordighera and San Remo for the culture of flowers), and planted currant-vines wherever there was room to grow them. But, while Greek production was thus trebled, France recovered from the phylloxera; in 1891 she was able to impose a duty upon currants; Germany and Russia followed her; and the Greek producer had masses of currants on his hands, which were a drug in the market. The cry went up for artificial measures to redress the wrongs inflicted upon nature by the sacrifice of the olives, for a good currant crop had become

a curse. The result was the Retention Law of 1899, which allowed the retention of 20 per cent. of the crop. As usual, this attempt at regulation produced the opposite effect of what was intended. Prices were again raised, with the same effect as before, that the peasants were eager to put more land under currant cultivation, and further over-production ensued. The currant question led indirectly to the fall of the Theotokes Ministry in 1903, and a fresh solution was attempted by the formation of an international Privileged Company, which endeavoured to increase the demand by popularizing the use of currants for other purposes besides plum-puddings in the two great Anglo-Saxon communities, which are Greece's chief customers for this article. It also tried to diminish the area under cultivation by compensating the proprietors for uprooting their currant-bushes.

Scarcely less difficult was the financial crisis of 1893, which occupied the politicians to the exclusion of most other questions. A British expert, Mr. (afterwards Sir) Edward Law,¹ traced its origin to "the general disorganization of the country produced by political events in 1885-6," and "since that date to excessive borrowing abroad, and equally to the laxity of an administration which neglected the proper collection of taxes, whilst the balance of trade was steadily

¹ *Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance*, 1169, p. 17 ; 1416, p. 4.

against the country." The Government had temporarily to reduce by 70 per cent. the amount paid as interest on the coupons of the Greek gold loans; negotiations with the representatives of the foreign bondholders fell through, and the apparent increase in the revenue for 1894, which was double that for 1885, was partly fictitious, owing to the diminution in value of the paper currency. It is very creditable to the probity of Greek public life that at a time when Ministries came and fell upon questions of finance, and when statesmen were mainly concerned with financial operations, the breath of scandal never once touched any of them. The pecuniary prizes of office in Greece have always been ridiculously small, but there is no example of any Greek Premier having used his official opportunities to enrich himself. Trikoupes and Deligiannes, the rival protagonists of that day, lived and died poor; nor has even partisan acrimony accused their great successor of an offence not unknown in some greater countries.

Another social and economic question first appeared in Greek life during this period. The depression of the currant trade and the rise in prices led to emigration, especially to the United States—a phenomenon which had not existed before 1891. Its chief economic effect was the depletion of the agricultural districts; socially it led to the introduction of Western ideas into remote parts of Greece. The writer has met persons speaking English with a strong American

accent in a very inaccessible town of the Peloponnese, and to the energy, activity and patriotism of some of the emigrants, who hastened from overseas at their country's call in 1912, were attributed some of the successes of the Greek army in the first Balkan war. These "Americans" have their newspapers and their organizations, and to the already existing Hellenic colonies abroad, some dating several centuries back, some possessing great influence in politics as well as commerce, there have been added in these last thirty years those in the United States. The official memorandum, presented by M. Venizelos to the Peace Congress of 1919, estimated the Greeks in North and South America as 450,000.

These economic crises were succeeded by a fresh outbreak of the Cretan question, which involved Greece for the first time since the struggle for independence in war with Turkey. In 1889 there had been another Cretan insurrection, which, beginning out of a parliamentary fight between the two political parties, the so-called Liberals and Conservatives, for the spoils of office, developed into a religious and national conflict between Christians and Moslems. When union with Greece was again proclaimed, Trikoupes, then in power at Athens, did all he could to damp the untimely ardour of the Unionists, for the time was, he thought, not yet ripe. A firman, repealing the Pact of Halepa, reducing the numbers of the Assembly to fifty-seven, and giving Turkish-

speaking candidates a better chance for Cretan appointments, was subsequently modified by an increase of the members of the Assembly to sixty-five, of whom forty were Christians, by the summoning of that body, which had not met for six years, and by the appointment of a Christian *váli*. Both Christians and Moslems remained, however, discontented, until the final Cretan insurrection, which sounded the death-knell of Turkish rule, began at Canea on May 24, 1896. The Sultan vainly restored the Pact of Halepa and appointed another Christian *váli*; it was now too late for "reforms," which the Moslems opposed and the Christians suspected.

An attack upon the Christian quarter of Canea by the Moslems on February 4, 1897, drove the Christian insurgents (among them the future Premier of Greece) to occupy the "peninsula" (or Akroteri) which separates Canea from the famous bay of Suda. Once again union was proclaimed, and this time official Greece did not remain indifferent to the Cretan proclamation. Deligiannes was, as in 1885, in power, and on this occasion without a check, for his great rival, whose influence had always been on the side of peace, had met with the usual fate of Greek statesmen, alike in ancient and modern times, the ingratitude of his countrymen, and, after being defeated in the elections, had died in exile at Cannes—the greatest figure that modern Greece had so far produced.

Public opinion at Athens was much excited;

the first revival of the Olympic Games there in the previous year had helped to create much the same patriotic enthusiasm as was aroused by the Italian Jubilee Exhibition on the eve of the Libyan war. The large Cretan colony in Greece and the Cretan refugees, as always, were further incentives to action, and the King's sailor son, Prince George, started with a squadron of destroyers for "the great Greek island," which he was destined to govern, while Col. Vassos landed there in the name of the King. The last Turkish governor fled ignominiously, and the Admirals of the five Powers, then represented off Crete, occupied Canea, bombarding the insurgents on Akroteri, among them M. Venizelos, who told the writer that it was then that he found time to learn English! The Admirals proclaimed the autonomy of the island, and instituted a blockade; but by that time the mainland also was in a blaze. The so-called "National Society" clamoured and agitated for war; the King was in a difficult position; probably his own sound judgment was against the venture; but he may have hoped that the Powers would have helped him to save his face by intervening to prevent actual fighting; he would thus have been able to give way to their pressure, while having advocated war, like Otho in 1854. This is a not uncommon manœuvre in the Near East, where statesmen are sometimes thankful to the Powers for forcing them to do what they wanted, but had not the courage to do, from

fear of public opinion. In 1897, however, the Powers did not prevent war; indeed the action of a number of British members of Parliament stimulated the war-party at Athens, which mistook them for the British Government, then under Salisbury.

The writer, who was in Greece during the war, remembers the combination of patriotic enthusiasm with defective organization, which accompanied this ill-timed struggle. From the first the conflict on land was unequal, for behind the Turks were German instructors, while the virtues of democracy are not conspicuous on a battlefield, where it tends to make every soldier think himself the equal of his officer, and of good officers the Greeks then had few. Idealists who believed that other Christian races of the Balkans would rise and cut off the Turkish advance were disappointed, for the Sultan paid blackmail to Serbia and Bulgaria in the shape of more Macedonian bishoprics and schools. Thus Greece and Turkey were left alone. Happily this "Thirty Days' War" was short, and by land, except for the sturdy resistance of Smolenski, the hero of the struggle, who at one moment might have made himself dictator, if he had had political instinct, was disastrous for the Greeks. By sea they were the superiors of the Turks, but their fleet did little beyond a desultory bombardment of Preveza and Santi Quaranta. The presence of large Greek populations in the coast-towns of Turkey rendered an attack upon

those vulnerable points impossible, for the chief sufferers would have been the "unredeemed" Greeks; and it is probable that, just as Austria vetoed the bombardment of certain Turkish places by the Italian navy in the Libyan war, so the Powers prevented the seizure of practically defenceless Turkish islands as a pledge by the Greek fleet in 1897. Thus Greece fought with one arm, the right, tied behind her back.

The retreat of the Crown Prince, Constantine (the future "Bulgar-slayer," but not yet an eminent general), from Larissa, the Greek defeat on the famous battlefield of Pharsalos, where Cæsar and Pompey had contended for the mastery of the world, and the culminating battle of Domokos, which laid continental Greece south of Thessaly open to the invaders, showed that further bloodshed was useless, especially as the Sultan knew full well that he would not be allowed to retain his conquests. For a moment, however, the throne was in danger, and the King might have fallen, had it not been for the influence of the popular democratic Athenian leader, Rhalles, who had taken the place of Deligiannes as Premier. The position was all the more dangerous owing to the return from the front of the Garibaldians, who had come to fight for Greece and who might, it was feared, remain to sack Athens. Their leader, General Ricciotti Garibaldi, wisely removed them; thanks to the tardy, but effective, intervention of the Powers, the Turkish advance was

stayed by an armistice ; and Crete was evacuated.

The treaty of Constantinople on December 4 gave back Thessaly to Greece, except a few strategic points and a single village, but Greece had to pay a war indemnity. The opportunity was taken at the same time to establish an International Commission of Control over her revenues, upon which the six Powers were each to have a delegate. Thus the war brought a solution of the financial crisis. In 1898 the last Turkish troops left Thessaly, which became more Greek than before owing to the simultaneous emigration of nearly all the Moslem landlords. Thus, Greece had paid comparatively lightly for her venture. Nor was the lesson of 1897 thrown away upon the Greeks. They learned the necessity of organization and discipline, the hardest of all lessons for a Southern people of strikingly individualistic tendencies ; for what one Southerner will do better than three Anglo-Saxons, three Southerners will do worse than one Anglo-Saxon. The war of 1912 completely wiped out the memories of 1897 ; the Greek army which defeated the Turks in that year was no more the Greek army which had retreated from Larissa than was the Serbian army which routed the Turks at Kumanovo the Serbian army which had lost Slivnitza. Moreover, one result of this disastrous war was the establishment of Cretan autonomy and the all but nominal end of Turkish rule over that sorely-tried island.

The Powers had at last realized, after the experience of two generations, that direct Ottoman sway must cease there ; but they were unwilling to permit union, and still clung to the idea of a foreign governor, selected from one of the small Christian states, Switzerland (in the person of Numa Droz), Luxemburg (in that of a Greek-speaking colonel), or Montenegro (in that of the Prince's cousin and Premier). While the question was still unsettled, the two Central Empires retired from the Concert of Europe, leaving to the four other Powers the task of occupying the Cretan coast-towns, within which the Moslems were concentrated. Thus, Canea became the common seat of all four, while Candia was the British, Rethymne the Russian, Sitia and Spinalonga the French, and Hierapetra the Italian reserve. Outside these places a Christian Assembly, whose President was Sphakianakes, dominated the country. A British Admiral was destined to cut the diplomatic knot, which seemed to have become hopelessly entangled, by his strong measures against the Moslems at Candia, who, in 1898, murdered the British Vice-Consul and fired upon the British in the harbour. The remaining Turkish troops evacuated Crete, with the exception of the islet in Suda bay, over which the Turkish flag still floated. Suda had been one of the two last places which the Turks had captured from the Venetians ; it was the last that they retained—a mere shadow of their former power.

Thereupon, at the suggestion of the Tsar, largely moved by personal friendship, the four Powers offered the still vacant Cretan Governorship to Prince George of Greece, who was to act as their High Commissioner, while nominally remaining the vassal of the Sultan. His appointment was to be for three years—it really lasted for nearly eight. On December 21, 1898—a red-letter day in Cretan history—the first Greek Governor of the island since the Roman Conquest landed in Crete. Great was the joy of the Cretan Christians; it was hoped that Crete would no longer vex the European diplomatists who sat in Rome to watch over their latest creation. But Crete is like Ireland: when one grievance is removed, another arises; and the Cretan politicians found that autonomy was not a panacea, and that a Prince of no political experience and autocratic temperament was scarcely likely to work well with his local advisers, especially when one of them was a statesman, then little known to fame, of the stamp of M. Venizelos.

Cretan history under Prince George consists of two parts: his first happy and tranquil five years, and the turbulent remainder of his term. He began with the best intentions: he meant to be the Prince of all Cretans, Moslems and Christians alike; and his respective pilgrimages to the historic monastery of Arkadion and to the principal mosque of Canea were the outward expressions of this excellent policy. One of the first acts of

his rule was the appointment of a commission of both creeds to compile a constitution, which was submitted to an Assembly and by it approved. The Prince was to be assisted by five "Councillors," of whom one was to be a Moslem and of whom all were appointed by himself, and he was further entitled to nominate ten deputies to the elective Chamber, which was to meet annually and to be renewed biennially. Thus he had considerable powers, which made all the more important his personal qualifications for the difficult art of governing Cretans. Autonomy was completed by the adoption of a Cretan flag, the issue of Cretan stamps and small change, and by the creation of a Cretan police force in place of the Montenegrins, who had latterly acted in that capacity. This force, trained by Italian carabinieri, was very efficient and, after the union, rendered service to Greece also, where one tall Cretan policeman has been seen to keep a crowd in order in a manner that would not disgrace Scotland Yard.

The Powers accordingly thought that young Crete might now walk alone; their authorities withdrew from their respective districts, but an unfortunate result of the withdrawal of the British from Candia, the chief Moslem centre, was such a Moslem emigration to Asia Minor that the census of 1900 revealed the fact that the Moslems formed only one-ninth of the population, and outside Canea, Candia and Rethymne were a negligible

quantity. This emigration, partly due to the natural reluctance of a once dominant minority to remain under a formerly subordinate majority, partly to artificial stimulants from Constantinople, was both a benefit and a loss to the island. Politically, it simplified the situation by giving to Crete an overwhelmingly Christian and Unionist complexion; economically, it deprived the island of a valuable element in its population. But this large reduction of the Moslem population enabled the large Christian majority to indulge, as is the way with large majorities, in the luxury of internal disputes. As he gained, or thought that he had gained, more experience of local conditions, the Prince became more autocratic; he quarrelled with the Assembly over the questions of a press censorship and the control of the elections of mayors; he dismissed his wisest Councillor, M. Venizelos, accused of preferring to union the crection of Crete into a principality like Samos.

Venetian and Turkish traditions were still strong in Crete; accordingly, M. Venizelos and the Opposition followed the time-honoured practice of taking to the hills, and established a provisional National Assembly, in 1905, at Therisso, a mountain village, approached by a narrow defile from his birthplace at Mournies, behind Canea. Therisso had long been a famous stronghold, whence the Turks had found it hard to dislodge the insurgents. On this occasion winter alone compelled the seceders to yield—and then only to the Consuls

of the Powers—after having passed the usual vote of union with Greece. The incident, however, left a rancorous feeling behind it; for the Prince, who in 1906 resigned the High Commissionership, found it hard to forgive the daring Councillor who had resisted his will. Hence were sown the seeds of the future conflict between his elder brother and the insurgent of Therisso, become King Constantine's Prime Minister.

Prince George's resignation caused a further advance towards union; for the four protecting Powers allowed King George to choose his son's successor, and he chose wisely. Instead of an inexperienced, autocratic Prince, the new High Commissioner was the most moderate and least talkative of Greek public men, M. Alexander Zaïmes, the descendant of what our ancestors would have called "an old Whig family," which for generations had been in politics, in which M. Zaïmes had twice attained the rank of Premier and accomplished the task of making the best possible terms for Greece after the disastrous war with Turkey. Essentially a "safe man," M. Zaïmes succeeded in ensuring quiet; a further step towards union was the substitution of retired Greek officers for the Italians in the police, and the organization by them of a native militia. Crete ceased to make history.

CHAPTER IX

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION (1898-1908)

AFTER the Turkish war Greece enjoyed a period of rest, during which her politics were mainly internal. Had this interval been employed for the improvement of the parliamentary system, the "Military League" of 1909 might have been unnecessary, and the humiliation which the country underwent in that year from Turkey avoided. But it was still the heyday of personal parties, of log-rolling and the "spoils" system," and domestic politics were a game of ins and outs, in which from 1899 to 1905 Theotokes, a lieutenant of Trikoupes, and the first Corfiote who attained to the Premiership, contended for office with old Deligiannes, till the latter, still hale and hearty, fell by the hand of a vulgar assassin—the first instance since Capo d'Istria of the murder of a leading Greek politician, although in Deligiannes' case the crime was due not to politics but to the aged Minister's severe action against gambling-hells, which had become the curse of Athens.

Cabinets fell during this period with frequency and on the most frivolous pretexts. Theotokes

was on one occasion sacrificed to a violent agitation against a vulgar translation of the Gospels. The Greeks, fortunate in alone possessing the originals of the Gospels in the language of their forefathers, are naturally anxious to preserve the *ipsissima verba* of the Evangelists, just as, without so cogent a reason, most Englishmen prefer the Authorized to the Revised Version of the Bible, even if some Jacobean phraseology has a changed, or even no meaning for Georgian readers. The motives of the Greek Revisers were excellent: they wanted the Gospels to be read in the common speech of the unlearned people, although the difference between New Testament Greek and the Greek of the modern Athenian journal is not enormous. But the question, like all questions in Greece, soon passed from the spheres of religion and philology into the all-embracing realm of politics. Opponents hinted that Russia was behind the new translation, which was the first move in a scheme for depriving the Orthodox Greek Church of her most precious possession—the original language of the Evangelists. Put in this way, the matter became one of national policy, and so deeply was it felt that a special addition was made to the revised constitution in 1911, prohibiting the translation of the Scriptures without the consent of both the Church in Greece and the Œcumenical Patriarch.

A like question, which in any other country would have been exclusively literary, but in Greece was political and national, agitated Athens in

1903. M. Soteriades, a well-known scholar, had produced the *Æschylean Trilogy* in a version which, according to some of his critics, was not free from certain vulgarisms. The students were up in arms, the Ministry had, under the pressure of public opinion, to prohibit further performances, and the attention of foreigners was again drawn to the violent feelings which the language question evokes in Greece. Just as at one time in Italy it was sufficient to condemn a prisoner to say that he had "spoken ill of Garibaldi," so to injure an Athenian professor it sufficed to accuse him of using the vulgar language in his lectures. "By their speech ye shall know them."

Such were the elegant questions which then occupied public men, of whom Theotokes, after the death of Deligiannes, was the most prominent. His handsome presence, his courtly manners and his undoubted abilities made him a good second-class leader; for this was the age of the "successors"—Theotokes of Trikoupes, Rhalles and Mavromichales rival heirs of Deligiannes—all clever party leaders, but none gifted with the statesmanlike gift of reconstruction which Greece needed before she could become great.

Meanwhile, beyond her still narrow borders, another question which keenly interested the Greek race had taken the place of Crete. Macedonia had long been "the promised land" of Greek ambitions. Historical associations play a very practical part in the Near East, and

Alexander the Great was a Macedonian. Later in Greek history Macedonia had been a portion of the Byzantine Empire. But unfortunately other rival races had historical claims there also; the Serbs recalled their great Tsar, Stephen Dushan, with his capital at Skopje; the Bulgars pointed to their famous Tsar Samuel with his residences on the Macedonian lakes of Prespa and Ochrida; while the Turks had been in possession, rather, however, as a garrison than as permanent settlers, for about five centuries. Political arguments drawn from ancient, or even mediæval history, have, however, a mediocre value for Western Europeans. No English Jingo would dream of claiming the French possessions of Edward III, who was Dushan's contemporary; no Italian Nationalist would advocate the annexation of Yorkshire because Septimius Severus died at York. Statistics of the present population are the usual argument which appeals to the Western mentality. But they are precisely the weak point of the Eastern, even apart from any desire to adapt them to the proof of a national claim. "Balkan statistics," it has been said, "are like the figures in Herodotus": they must be received with caution. Thus a sincere seeker after truth, arriving at Salonika twenty years ago, would have had from the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian Consulates there masses of figures proving conclusively that the Macedonian population was mainly Greek, Serbian or Bulgarian. Under these

circumstances the diplomatist at the Court of King Nicholas of Montenegro was wise, who, when the King offered him statistics to prove Montenegro's indubitable right to certain territory, replied to the Royal author of "The Empress of the Balkans": "Sire, I know that Your Majesty is a poet!" Without attempting to fix the proportions of the different nationalities, it could be asserted that Macedonia was a *macédoine* of races—Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Koutzo-Wallachs (or "Macedonian Roumanians," formerly classified as Greeks), Turks, and at Salonika Spanish Jews—these last subdivided into practising Hebrews and Deunmehs, or Jews converted to Islam—besides the usual Levantine population of an Eastern sea-port—people who speak all languages, have none of their own, and call themselves subjects of whichever great Power happens to be temporarily predominant in Turkey. But this was not the whole difficulty. Austria-Hungary, installed in Bosnia and the *Sanjak* of Novibazar since 1878, was believed to meditate in due time a descent upon Salonika; it was, therefore, her interest to keep the Turkish Empire going until that time had arrived.

Meanwhile, the state of Macedonia had gone from bad to worse; Article 23 of the Berlin treaty, which promised reforms, had remained unexecuted, while the "big Bulgaria" of the treaty of San Stefano was regarded by the Bulgarians as their promised charter one day to be realized. The

various Macedonian claimants spent money upon propaganda there which could sometimes be ill-spared; even Roumania, since the "discovery" of the Koutzo-Wallachs as her long-lost children, encouraged their schools and, as the weakest of the contending Christian races, these "Macedonian Roumanians" were also encouraged by Turkey, whom they wished to survive until they should be strong enough to take her place there. For a time the Austro-Russian agreement for maintaining the *status quo* in the Balkans kept Macedonia quiet. But at Sofia, where there were many Macedonians, just as there were Cretans at Athens, a Macedonian Committee, with a physical force section, came into prominence, and Bulgarian bands began operations beyond the frontier, victimizing Turks and Greeks alike. The latter, as neither the various Austro-Russian programmes of Macedonian reforms nor the Turkish authorities could protect them, took the law into their own hands, and in 1904 Greek bands made their appearance. Thus Macedonia became the cockpit of Greek and Bulgarian irregulars, at whose performances their respective civil and ecclesiastical authorities connived, and whose leaders were canonized at home as national heroes. The racial conflict between Bulgar and Greek spread to Bulgaria, where two Greek colonies were destroyed. The British Government preached reasonableness at Sofia and Athens, but the bands did not listen to reason, and the struggle continued,

despite the division of Macedonia into five sections, each policed by one of the five Powers. Germany, as usual, held aloof.

Then came the Turkish Revolution of 1908, born in Macedonia. The Greeks, with their long experience of the Turks, never shared the optimistic belief of the British Foreign Secretary that the prefix of an adjective and the proclamation of a constitution would make the "Young" Turks British Liberals, tolerant of other races and creeds. A Greek sat in the Turkish Cabinet, eighteen were elected to the Turkish Parliament; but it was soon discovered that the latter was strongly nationalist, and that the "Young" Turks, like some older rulers, might be glad of a war against Greece to make their critics forget the blunders of their domestic policy. Crete, as usual, furnished the opportunity. Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary had both seized that of the Turkish revolution, the one to have himself proclaimed "Tsar of the Bulgarians," not merely of Bulgaria, the other to annex the "occupied" provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Crete forthwith, in the absence of the prudent M. Zaïmes, proclaimed union with Greece.

CHAPTER X

THE INTERNAL RECONSTRUCTION OF GREECE (1909-12)

THE Cretan question seemed at this moment to be in a more favourable condition than on the occasion of former proclamations of union. The Central Empires had veered round to support any proposal for this solution; the other Powers were prepared to have the subject discussed with Turkey, on condition that the lives of the Moslem minority were properly protected. Turkey was in a state of embarrassment, internal and external; the Bulgarians might make common cause with the Greeks and so prevent a repetition of the Thessalian invasion of 1897; and Abdul Hamid, with whom a deal was always possible, was still on the throne. The Cretans, on their part, had made full preparations. A pentarchy, of which one member was M. Venizelos, had been appointed to carry on the government in the name of King George, to whom oaths were taken; the Greek Constitution substituted the Cretan; philatelists welcomed with delight a surcharged issue of Cretan stamps. But the then Athenian Government under

Theotokes, instead of placing the bewildered Turks before the accomplished fact of union, which the Powers, after a mild protest, would probably have recognized, allowed valuable time to elapse.

Meanwhile, the military party got the upper hand in Turkey. Abdul Hamid was deposed, and the Porte actually tried to restore in Crete the state of things existent before 1898. In July, 1909, Theotokes resigned in favour of Rhalles, the Premier of 1897, who had to face a situation almost as difficult as that which he had then surmounted. For the protecting Powers at this moment fulfilled their promise to withdraw their remaining troops from Crete, with the result that the Cretans immediately hoisted the Greek flag. Turkey thereupon demanded from the Greek Premier, who was nowise responsible—indeed, Rhalles was Turkophil for a Greek, and a very honest politician—a disclaimer of the Cretans' action; simultaneously the modern method of the boycott was applied to Greek goods in Turkish ports, and the recall of the Turkish Minister was threatened. The Turkish notes became stronger; but the Powers, to whom Rhalles appealed, saved the situation by sending their marines to cut down the Greek flagstaff, which had so greatly incensed the Turks, and telling the latter that, if Greece had "nothing to do" with Crete, Europe had. Thus, the crisis of 1909, which at one time threatened to be another 1897, ended. The effect

upon the Greeks was much like that of the enforced surrender of Serbia in the Bosnian question in the same year upon the Serbs: it made them resolve to do everything possible to prevent a similar humiliation. This was the origin of the "revolution" of 1909, as that was the origin of M. Venizelos' summons to come from Crete to reorganize Greece. Thus the humiliation of 1909 led to the triumph of 1912.

Three months earlier a "Military League" had arisen among the younger officers, who had come to the conclusion that the professional politicians were the chief obstacle to the future of the country. The surrender to Turkey caused this feeling to find vent in action. The officers of the League encamped at Goudi, outside Athens, under the leadership of Col. Zorbas; this *pronunciamiento* provoked the resignation of Rhalles and the appointment as Premier of the docile Mavromichales, who reigned while the League governed. Its programme was drastic, but popular. While disclaiming any anti-dynastic purpose, the League insisted on the exclusion of the Royal Princes from commands in the army, the appointment of professional soldiers and sailors as Ministers of War and Marine, and the reorganization of both services. A national foreign policy, it was realized, must have for its basis a strong army and navy, for Turkey recognizes no argument but force, whereas previous Greek politicians had sometimes had at their disposal no force but

argument. The trade guilds, a powerful influence at Athens, supported the League; the provinces were on its side; but the politicians tried to put up a last defence of their prerogative of placing party before national interests. Thereupon the Leaguers, in Cromwellian fashion, intimated their intention of seizing the Parliament House. King George, however, interposed his good offices, and the Chamber turned out military reforms at the League's bidding with machinelike rapidity. Royalty severed its connection with the army, of which the Crown Prince ceased to be Commander-in-Chief. Efficiency was the order of the day. But the League had been too successful. Its easy triumph made it arrogant; it ordered at its good pleasure the dismissal of Ministers, the recall of diplomatists and the enactment of statutes at lightning speed. Athenian democracy had become a military despotism, necessary perhaps as a temporary expedient, but not likely to be lasting.

The League seems, indeed, to have been conscious of its own defects in the difficult art of constructive government, and, in a moment of inspiration, decided to import a law-giver from outside. Its choice fell upon the Cretan politician, M. Venizelos, who was personally known to some of its members. Eleutherios Venizelos was then without continental experience; but two sage statesmen had already foretold his great future. M. Clemenceau had found on a Cretan tour that the most remarkable product of the island was a

lawyer about whose exact name he was uncertain, but of whom he was convinced that ere long all Europe would be ringing with it ; M. Zaïmes, when High Commissioner, had prophesied that, if this Cretan opponent of Prince George could but come to terms with the Royal family, he would be the saviour of Greece. If he lacked knowledge of local Greek affairs, he possessed what the Greek politicians lacked—a fresh and independent mind, untrammelled by party ties and traditions. He was that rare phenomenon in Southern public life—character combined with intelligence, an irresistible combination everywhere. Invited to give his advice, he recommended the calling of a National Assembly to revise the Constitution. All three parties concerned accepted his suggestion—the Crown with reluctance, because of Constitutional scruples, for it was impossible to go through all the previous formalities technically required for a revision of the Charter of 1864 ; the politicians conditionally on the dissolution of the League ; the League patriotically, although it thereby committed suicide. Its chief became Minister of War in a Cabinet presided over by old Dragoumes, in 1910, with the express purpose of convening a National Assembly. As soon as the bill for that object became law, the League was as good as its word, and, having saved Greece by its exertions, closed its career with an act of self-sacrifice.

To the National Assembly of 358 deputies M.

Venizelos, who was still chief of the Cretan Provisional Government, was elected, and being technically a Greek subject, was able to accept his election, despite a Turkish protest. He then resigned his Cretan office and transferred his energies to the bigger stage of Greek politics. He was almost immediately put into the foremost place. Dragoumes, unable to cope with the Assembly, resigned, and on October 18, 1910—a memorable day in Hellenic history, M. Venizelos, then forty-six years of age, was appointed Prime Minister by King George, who thus set a noble example of subordinating family feeling to the public welfare. Thenceforth the King and his son's old opponent worked together for Greece, as the Emperor William I had worked with Bismarck, as Victor Emmanuel II had worked with Cavour.

There were two main currents of opinion in the Assembly, one favourable to the idea that it should limit itself to the work of revision, the other inclined to convert it into a Constituent body. Besides this question of principle, in which M. Venizelos had adopted the revisionist view, there was the natural jealousy of the old party leaders to this "new man" from Crete, who was not even an Ionian, like Theotokes, nor had worked his way up through the hierarchy of office, like the other ex-Premiers. The usual Greek device of abstaining so as to prevent a quorum, was tried. But the Cretan ex-insurgent was a man of rapid decisions ;

he instantly resigned; all the best elements of public opinion demanded his recall, and he advised the King to dissolve the recalcitrant Assembly. A fresh election, from which the old party leaders abstained, made him practical dictator with a power such as Trikoupes in all his glory had never possessed.

Elected under such circumstances, the "Second Revisionary National Assembly" passed the Constitution as revised in June, 1911. Warned by experience, the legislators reduced the quorum to one-third of all the deputies, made soldiers ineligible, adopted the British system of removing election petitions from the decision of the Chamber to a special tribunal; revived the Council of State, which had existed in the early part of Otho's reign, but had been eliminated from the Constitution of 1864; abolished the "spoils" system in the civil service—one of the greatest plagues of Greek life under the party system; made primary education free and compulsory; and dealt with the agrarian question in Thessaly. In the light of later history, special interest attaches to the measure making a post, that of Inspector-General of the Army, for the Crown Prince, who thus, thanks to M. Venizelos, was able to regain a military position. Then the National Assembly was replaced in 1912 by an Ordinary Chamber of 181 members, of whom the overwhelming majority was Venizelist. To this Chamber the Cretans sent a large contingent, but their resolute com-

patriot declined to allow them to endanger his work of peaceful reorganization by taking their seats and so provoking another crisis with Turkey, before the British Naval and French Military Missions had trained the Greeks. We now know that there was a special reason for his action, because at that very moment the treaty of alliance between Greece and Bulgaria was on the eve of signature, an annex to which declared Bulgaria to be merely benevolently neutral in the event of a Greco-Turkish war arising out of the admission of the Cretans to the Greek Chamber. But at the time few men in M. Venizelos' position could have acted as he acted. The Cretans yielded, and the Chamber was adjourned till October. When it met, the Premier, with the Balkan League duly formed, was able to admit the Cretan deputies and declare war on Turkey.

Already Italy had, in 1911, attacked her in Libya, and in April and May, 1912, had occupied the thirteen Southern Sporades—Rhodes, Kos, Kalymnos, Leros, Nisyros, Telos, Syme, Chalke, Astypalaia, Karpáthos, Kasos, Patmos and Leipso—known colloquially, but inaccurately, as the *Dodekánesos*, for the real *Dodekánesos* (a term first used by Theophanes early in the ninth century) excluded Rhodes, Kos and Leipso, but included Ikaria, which at this time declared its independence, and Kastellorizon. These islands, although they had belonged to Turkey since the sixteenth century, were inhabited by an almost wholly

Greek population ; for out of a total of 118,837 inhabitants, 102,727 were Greeks, and only 16,110 Turks, Jews and others, of whom 12,070 were in Rhodes, 4,020 in Kos, 20 in Patmos and none in the other islands. Before the Latin Conquest of Constantinople they had all formed part of the Byzantine Empire, and even after that date first the Greek family of Gabalas and then the Greek Empire of Nicæa had occupied Rhodes, Karpathos and Kasos. The islands then fell into three groups : the first eight (with Kastellorizon, or " Castel Rosso," as the Italians called it) belonged to the Knights of Rhodes from 1309 to 1522 (except that, in 1450, the Pope gave " the Red Castle " to the King of Naples) ; the next three, Astypalaia, Karpathos and Kasos, belonged to the Venetian families of Quirini and Cornaro (save for a brief usurpation of the two last by the Knights) down to the Turkish Conquest in 1537 ; Patmos or Palmosa (with its dependency, Leipso), was regarded as a holy island, but paid tribute to the Turks in 1502.

The Turks granted special privileges to the " Twelve Islands." There are extant firmans ¹ of Mohammed IV in 1652, Osman III in 1755, Abdul Hamid I in 1774, and Mahmûd II in 1835, conceding them complete liberty " from all points of view " on payment of a fixed contribution

¹ Δελτίον τῆς Ἰστ. καὶ Ἑθν. Ἑταιρίας, vi. 321-50 ; Stéphanopoli, *Les Iles de l'Égée : leurs privilèges*, 162-68.

in place of all other taxes. Economic reasons dictated this liberal policy. The islands were poor and barren, their chief industry was sponge-fishing, and an elaborate system of tax-gathering would have cost more than it yielded. The insular provinces were under the jurisdiction of the Capitan Pasha; a Turkish governor and a judge resided at Rhodes and another Turkish judge at Kos; but the islanders managed their own affairs through elected "Elders of the people," who collected the local taxes, chiefly a duty on sponges, and transmitted a lump sum to the Porte, spending the balance on schools (the first necessity for a Greek), doctors and the municipal pharmacy, and using Greek for their official correspondence. We learn from the firmans that rapacious Turkish officials sometimes broke these regulations; but, on the complaint of the islanders, backed no doubt by the solid arguments most efficacious at the Porte, these irregular exactions were prohibited. In the War of Independence they suffered severely, notably Kasos and Kos, the former of which had been specially prominent in the Greek cause, whereas Rhodes was terrorized by a Turkish force. Excluded against their wishes from the Greek Kingdom, they continued, however, to enjoy their ancient privileges undisturbed down to 1867.

During the Cretan insurrection the Porte resolved to assimilate the administration of these privileged islands to that of the other Turkish

provinces, and a Turkish Governor, with troops to support him, landed at Syme. But the inhabitants appealed to the British Foreign Office quoting the firman of Mahmûd II, and representations from the British Government at Constantinople led to the recall of the Governor and his men. But, as soon as the Cretan insurrection was over in 1869, the Governor of the Archipelago blockaded Syme, installing a Turkish garrison and deputy-governors there and in the other islands. The islanders thereupon sent a deputation to London; Lord Clarendon communicated their complaints to Constantinople, and Aali Pasha denied "any intention of modifying the fiscal system hitherto prevailing in the islands; the sole object of the Porte was to introduce a better system of administration." This denial was followed a little later by various encroachments on their privileges; seven of the "Twelve Islands" were annexed to the *Sanjak* of Rhodes, the other five to that of Chios; and Syme, always the most stubborn, was blockaded in 1886, and its notables imprisoned in 1893. Still, despite these inroads, the "Twelve Islands" still retained in part their fiscal autonomy till the Turkish revolution of 1908. The "Young" Turks wished to establish uniformity there as elsewhere; in 1909, the Porte, with a stroke of the pen, suppressed all their privileges, imposed Turkish as the official language, and made the islanders liable to conscription, which in their case

meant starvation for their families who depended upon the gains of the sponge-fishing which only the young can practise. The islanders protested and appealed to the ancient firmans ; the Government stated it could only find in its archives those of four islands, but provisionally agreed to content itself with the old system of a single tax "until a definite decision upon this subject." In 1912, this decision was reached ; it consisted of the complete annulment of the insular privileges. But before it could be executed, the islands had been occupied by the Italians.

Under these circumstances the islanders naturally welcomed them as liberators, and assisted them to win the battle of Psinthos, especially as General Ameglio on May 4 proclaimed to the Rhodians that "the Turkish sovereignty is suppressed at Rhodes and in the Dodekanese, whose fate could be none other than their autonomy and their 'self-government,'" adding that "after the war, your islands, occupied provisionally by Italy, will be provided with an autonomous *régime*," while Admiral Presbitero expressed to the Kalymniotes his "confidence in their free government." The Italians, however, disapproved of the decisions of the insular Congress, at Patmos, on June 17th, to proclaim the islands the autonomous "State of the Ægean," with the image of the Sun-God (the pagan patron of Rhodes) on a blue flag intersected by a white cross as its emblem, until such time as union with Greece could

be accomplished. Nothing was said of either union or autonomy in the treaty of Lausanne, which closed the Libyan war, and which pledged Italy to recall her troops from the islands as soon as the Turkish forces and functionaries had evacuated Libya, merely contenting herself with obtaining a promise of amnesty for the islanders. Greece realized during the first Balkan war that the Italian occupation was more detrimental to her than the continued rule of Turkey; for as the thirteen Sporades were still held by the Italians, her fleet could not capture them as it captured the other Turkish islands. For that reason during the late war Austria was able to obtain popularity in Greece, when Baron Sonnino incautiously let out the secret in the Italian "Green Book,"¹ that Austrian opposition had alone prevented the Italian occupation of the much more important islands of Chios and Lesbos, which Greece would thus have lost, as she has lost the Dodekanese. Sig. Giolitti declared the occupation to have been "purely military," and that Italy "could not pretend to annex territories of Greek nationality." Sir E. Grey² stated that "the destiny of these Ægean Islands—including those in the temporary occupation of Italy—is a matter which concerns all the Great Powers, and no Great Power is to retain one of these islands for itself." Nevertheless Article 8 of the treaty of London of 1915, which secured

¹ P. 25.

² *Morning Post*, August 13, 1913.

Italy's entrance into the war, deliberately gave her "entire sovereignty" over them. But the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement¹ of July 29, 1919, which was to come into force contemporaneously with the subsequent treaty of Sèvres, ceded twelve of the islands to Greece, while fifteen years after the date of signature of the agreement, should Great Britain cede Cyprus to Greece, Rhodes would hold a *plébiscite* under the auspices of the League of Nations to decide her own future. Meanwhile, in two months' time, Italy would grant her "a large local autonomy."

On July 22, 1920, however, Sig. Tittoni's successor, Count Sforza, denounced this agreement as void in view of the changed circumstances. The Italians remain in the Dodekanese, where they are having much the same difficulty as we had in the Ionian Islands, while their islands are much less valuable. Indeed, most of them are rocks. Meanwhile, the Athenian press contrasts the more liberal treatment of the Cypriote clergy by the British with that meted out to the Metropolitan of Rhodes. That, like Corfu and Cyprus, they will ultimately fall to Greece is probable, and a *beau geste* on the part of Italy will cost her little and gain her what she has lost—that Greek sympathy which was unreservedly hers during the Libyan war. For from the summer of 1912 dates the estrangement of these two formerly friendly neighbours.

¹ *Corriere della Sera*, Sept. 1, 1920. Also Venizelos-Bonin agreement of Aug. 10, 1920.

CHAPTER XI

THE EXPANSION OF GREECE (1912-13).

THE Libyan war, although it injured Greece in the Ægean, benefited her on the continent, for it provided the occasion for the first Balkan war ; indeed, Greece declared hostilities against Turkey on the same day that Italy signed the treaty of Lausanne. This time Greece was well prepared, and did not fight alone. Hitherto no statesman had succeeded, although Trikoupes had tried in 1891, in forming a Balkan League against the Turks, who had always kept their Christian neighbours divided by their neutral jealousies. It was reserved for M. Venizelos to accomplish what had seemed impossible.

As early as April, 1911, with the approval of King George, the only other Greek statesman in the secret, he had sent to Sofia through an Englishman living in Vienna a proposal for a Greco-Bulgarian defensive alliance against Turkey. Circumstances were favourable ; for the " Young " Turkish policy of " Turkification " made the Greeks and Bulgarians form a coalition in Macedonia and Thrace for the general election to the Ottoman Parliament in 1911. Bulgarian caution, however, long delayed the acceptance of his offer.

But the Libyan war led Bulgaria to consider the opportunity of attacking Turkey ; she concluded, on March 13, 1912, a treaty with Serbia, and seventeen days later an alliance with Greece—largely the work of J. D. Bouchier, the famous Balkan correspondent of *The Times*, who enjoyed the confidence of both MM. Venizelos and Gueshov, the Bulgarian Premier. This treaty pledged both parties to mutual aid, should either be attacked by Turkey, to ensure “the peaceful co-existence” of the Greek and Bulgarian populations of Turkey, and to co-operate in securing the rights of those nationalities. The treaty was to remain valid for three years, and, unless denounced, to be automatically renewed. An annex provided for the above-mentioned case of the admission of the Cretans to the Greek Parliament, which should not be a *casus fœderis*. A verbal understanding with Montenegro completed the League as far as Greece was concerned. The usual incidents and massacres foreboded the approaching struggle ; the grant of a sort of autonomy to Albania challenged the aspirations of Greece and her Allies, who demanded the enforcement of the dormant Article 23 of the Berlin treaty, to which the Porte replied by exhuming the forgotten law of 1880 for provincial reforms. There followed the Montenegrin declaration of war, the ultimatum of the other three Allies, and the scornful Turkish reply.

Before declaring war, M. Venizelos admitted the Cretan deputies to the Greek Chamber, thus

recognizing the union with Crete, whither the ex-Premier, Dragoumes, was sent as Governor. Then came the dramatic collapse of the Turkish Empire in Europe, in which all the Allies bore their part. The Greek military contribution on the East was the victory of Sarantaporon, the capture of Southern Macedonia, terminated by the two days' struggle at Jenitsá by the Vardar, and the capitulation, on November 8, the feast of its patron, St. Demetrios (who had so often defended it against aliens in the Middle Ages), of Salonika to the Crown Prince, after 482 years of Turkish domination. On the West, the Greeks took Preveza, Metzovon and Cheimarra in Epeiros; by sea they occupied nine islands, and that venerable monastic republic, the "holy mountain" of Mt. Athos, while to their Allies, destitute of naval power, the Greek fleet rendered the inestimable service of shutting up the Turkish navy within the Dardanelles and closing the Ægean to Turkish transports from Asia Minor. Greece continued hostilities, even after the signature of the armistice at Chatalja by her three Slav Allies, but participated in the Conference between them and Turkey, which met in London on December 16. The dilatory tactics of the Turkish negotiators and the revolution in Constantinople demonstrated the wisdom of the Greeks in not allowing the Turks to gather reinforcements during the armistice. The negotiations broke down; the Allies resumed the war, while the Greeks had meanwhile

taken the famous Parga, thus obliterating the memories of its cession in 1819. On March 6, Joannina, which had been Turkish since 1430, but had kept alive the torch of Greek culture even in the darkest days of servitude, surrendered to the Crown Prince; soon a Greek army entered Argyrokastron, the chief town of Northern Epeiros, but a hint from Rome caused M. Venizelos to forbid the Prince to march upon Valona, where Ismail Kemal Bey had proclaimed an independent Albania, of which Italy was the champion.

Nine days after the surrender of Joannina, the eighty years' history of Samian autonomy ended in union with Greece. Samos, which had been, with one brief Byzantine interval, a Genoese possession from 1304 till the Turkish conquest in 1475, had proclaimed union in 1821, had during the insurrection remained practically independent under the dictatorship of the Samian, Logothetes, had been organized by Kolettes, as "Extraordinary Commissioner of the Eastern Sporades,"¹ in 1830 (when the population was found to be 27,449), and, after declaring her independence, had been forcibly constituted an autonomous tributary principality in 1832. No Turkish troops were to land in this essentially Greek island; the Prince was to be of the same religion as the islanders; the tribute was a lump sum of 40,000 piastres; the island had its own flag; and it was hoped that the islanders would be contented, as there

¹ *Δελτίον*, iv. 575.

was no Moslem element to cause difficulties, as in Crete, nor were the Samians Cretans. For sixty years the Government was usually stable; the first Prince, an absentee, governed Samos by lieutenants for nearly twenty, when a revolution led to his resignation and the grant of a new charter. Alike during the Eastern crises of 1854 and of the seventies, good administrators, thanks to British suggestion, killed union with kindness, bestowing educational and material advantages upon the island. Soon afterwards, however, the Samian Assembly discovered the fatal secret that it could make and unmake Princes by petitions to Constantinople. Like all Greeks, the Samians are politicians, and there, as elsewhere, politics became largely a question of spoils. "Samian wine" was the occasion of a disturbance, for an attempt to extirpate the phylloxera caused a revolt, and the Porte broke the promise of 1832 that no Turkish troops should be sent thither. From 1894 onwards, Princes succeeded each other in rapid succession, instead of the long reigns of the previous period. A drastic change in 1899 forced the Prince to accept (without power of dismissal) the four Councillors whom the Assembly of forty selected for him, while he was debarred from dissolving that body, of which he thus became the helpless creature. One Prince, the Cretan Kopasses, did, indeed, resist and refused to convoke the Assembly, with the result that he was blockaded in his palace, and, in 1912,

assassinated. One of his last acts was to provoke an Italian bombardment of Samos during the Libyan war by hoisting the Turkish, instead of the Samian, flag over the barracks, where he had unconstitutionally quartered Turkish troops. M. Sophoules, the most powerful of the islanders, who had long led the Opposition, and protested to the three protecting Powers against the Turkification of this autonomous island, in accordance with the policy already described in the case of the Dodekanese, then took the law into his own hands, and deposed the new Prince. In the ensuing Balkan war, Samos, like Ikaria, proclaimed union with Greece ; but M. Venizelos prudently accepted the Assembly's vote with reserve, in view of the peculiar international position of Samos. Not till March 15, 1913, did a Greek force take official possession of this island of 53,424 inhabitants.

In the midst of these Greek triumphs a terrible tragedy suddenly saddened the whole Hellenic world. After the capitulation of Salonika, King George had established his headquarters there, standing guard as a sentinel over that coveted conquest. On March 18, he went out, attended by a single aide-de-camp, to take his usual afternoon walk, talking with his customary affability to the people. On his way home, at a spot where two streets met, a badly-dressed man fired two shots at him from a revolver. The King fell speechless against the table of an adjoining shop, whence he was carried to a hospital, and there

expired without uttering a single word. The assassin, who was immediately seized by two Cretan policemen, turned out to be a Greek named Schinas, to whom the late King had once refused money. Thus, in the hour of his triumph, on the eve of celebrating, under unparalleled circumstances, the jubilee of his accession to the throne, King George fell, a victim of duty, in the streets of the city which he had just lived to see his own. His tact, his long experience, and his love of his adopted country had contributed not a little to this result. He left behind him a political testament, in which he spoke like a father to his eldest son. "Love," he wrote, "thy beloved little fatherland with all thy heart. . . . Have confidence, but have patience also. . . . Let the night pass before thou takest thy decision; be not angry, and let not the sun go down upon thy wrath . . . and never forget that thou art king of a Southern people, whose wrath and excitability is fired in a moment and in such a moment may say and do many things, which after a moment it perhaps forgets again. For this reason never be in a rage, and do not forget that it is often preferable that the King himself should suffer, even morally, rather than the people and the country." King George evidently knew his son's obstinate character.

The new King, whom many wished to call Constantine XII, thereby regarding him as the successor of the last Byzantine Emperor, mounted the throne with the laurels of Salonika and Joan-


nina fresh upon him. His triumphs on the field of battle, added to the fact that he was the first sovereign of modern Greece born in that country, invested him with an immense popularity, while the tragic circumstances of his father's death won for him sympathy everywhere.

As far as Greece was concerned, the fighting was over: the Allies, except Montenegro, concluded an armistice with the Turks at Bulair, and on May 30, 1913, the treaty of London ended the first Balkan war. The Sultan ceded to the Allies "all the territories of his Empire on the European continent to the west of a line drawn from Ænos, on the Ægean Sea, to Midia on the Black Sea, with the exception of Albania." The "delimitation of the frontiers of Albania and all other questions concerning Albania," together with "the care of deciding on the fate of all the Ottoman islands of the Ægean Sea (except the island of Crete) and of the peninsula of Mt. Athos" were "confided to the Great Powers." Crete was ceded to the Allies, *i.e.* to Greece. Thus, except in Thrace, European Turkey had ceased to exist.

But the Allies' victory had been too overwhelming and the spoils too valuable to prevent discord, which Austria, who saw her hopes of an advance into the Balkans debarred by their successes, was interested in promoting, while Italy, professing alarm lest the channel of Corfu might become a naval base, endeavoured to push the Greek frontier back from the bay of Grammata



THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF GREECE, 1832-1913



(where M. Venizelos had placed it so as to include Cheimarra) to Cape Stylos opposite the town of Corfu, despite his offer to neutralize the Epeirote coast. Even before the treaty of London was signed, the Bulgarians, jealous of the Greek possession of Salonika, attacked the Greeks in Mt. Panghaion, while Serbia demanded a revision of the Bulgarian pact of alliance. On June 30 began the second Balkan war, in which the Bulgarians were completely defeated by their three ex-Allies, joined by Roumania. The Greeks bore their part in this war by their victory at Kilkich on the railway between Salonika and Serres, and their fleet took Kavalla; but the retreating Bulgars fired the Greek part of Serres, and "Bulgarian atrocities" were reported from Nigrita, Doxaton and Drama. Macedonia and a large strip of the Thracian coast remained in Greek hands, and his people acclaimed King Constantine as a new "Bulgar-slayer," who had renewed on the same ground the triumph of Basil II over Tsar Samuel almost 900 years earlier.

Bulgaria was forced to accept on August 10 the third treaty of Bucharest, after a diplomatic struggle for Kavalla, with its port and famous tobacco-plantations. On this point King Constantine's insistence received unexpected support from the German Emperor, who later did not fail to claim gratitude for this service. The Greek eastern frontier started from the mouth of the Mesta, thus leaving Xanthe to Bulgaria, but

securing Kavalla, and Bulgaria formally abandoned any claims that she might have raised under the treaty of London to Crete. Despite Russian advocacy of a Bulgarian Kavalla and Austrian dislike of an enlarged Serbia, all the Powers acquiesced in this, the first experiment of a Balkan settlement made by Balkan statesmen. Greece and Serbia agreed to the partition of their conquests, and a Greco-Turkish treaty on November 14 was the last of these instruments.

Greece emerged from the Balkan wars with her territory increased from 25,014 square miles to 41,933, and with her population augmented from 2,631,952 at the census of 1907, and about 2,765,000 in 1912, to about 4,821,300 in 1914. While not a single mile of railway existed in Epeiros, she acquired in Macedonia 385 miles of line, thus making her total mileage 1,371; it required the construction of only 56 miles between Papapouli and Gida to link "Old" with "New" Greece by rail—a work completed on May 8, 1916. The dream of Otho had been realized, all Southern Macedonia, most of Epeiros, Crete, Samos and all the islands, except Tenedos, Imbros, Kastellorizon and the thirteen Sporades occupied by the Italians were included in the Greek kingdom. Moreover, as M. Venizelos said, it had been "not only doubled in area and population, but multiplied in wealth." But the racial aspects of the "New" Greece differed from those of the "Old," where practically all were Greeks, except a considerable number of Albanians, a few Turks and a certain number of

Koutzo-Wallachs in Thessaly, the "Great Wallachia" of the thirteenth century, and Jewish colonies at Corfu and in a few other places. But "New" Greece, with a large access of Hellenic blood, brought a small number of Albanians, a solid mass of Spanish Jews (mainly from Salonika), and still bigger contingents of Koutzo-Wallachs, Turks and Slavs. Subsequent events have shown that politically and, in a less degree, economically, "Old" and "New" Greece do not think alike, while the relations of the Piræus and Salonika somewhat resemble those of Venice and Trieste. But, owing to the European war, Greece has not yet had time to assimilate her new conquests, while in the Near East appetite is usually stronger than digestion. For administrative purposes, they were divided temporarily into four general administrations and permanently into fourteen provinces (five in Macedonia, two in Epeiros, four in Crete and three in the other islands), making thirty in all for the whole kingdom, to which they have not yet been ecclesiastically subordinated. The writer, however, found great improvement already in 1914 at both Salonika and Joannina as compared with previous visits in the Turkish days, and the commercial value of Kavalla would alone justify the tenacity of Greece in declining to cede it to Bulgaria.

There remained to be settled by the Great Powers the questions of Albania and the Ægean Islands. Commissioners were appointed to delimit the Albanian frontiers, and the "Florence Protocol"

of December 17, 1913, assigned to Albania Northern Epeiros, including the two important towns of Argyrokastron and Koritsa, the port of Santi Quaranta and the Acroceraunian community of Cheimarra—all places captured by the Greeks during the first Balkan war—together with the islet of Saseno in the bay of Valona, which had been Greek since 1864. A note of the Powers on February 13, 1914, made the definite recognition of Greek sovereignty over the captured islands contingent upon the previous evacuation of this territory. The Greek troops evacuated it, but meanwhile an Autonomous Government of Northern Epeiros was formed under the presidency of Zographos, an Epeirote, who had been Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, with a flag and stamps of its own, supported by a "Sacred Battalion" on the analogy of that of 1821. Thus an Albanian Ulster, led by men of wealth and position, arose, and fighting began. On May 17, however, a convention was signed at Corfu entrusting the organization of the two Southern provinces of Argyrokastron and Koritsa to the International Commission of Control for Albania; a local police force was to be formed by Dutch officers; Greek was to be the medium of instruction in the higher classes of the Orthodox schools and to have the same status as Albanian in the lower classes, the law-courts and the elective councils. An annex contained the demands of the Cheimarriotes for the use of their own banner, borne in the rising of 1770, and against Ali Pasha, and the appointment

of a foreigner as governor for ten years under the traditional name of "Captain." The Powers announced their approval of the Corfu convention on July 1; but during the chaos which ensued at Durazzo, the Epeirotes captured Koritsa.

The European war broke out soon afterwards, and in October Greek troops occupied Northern Epeiros, at the request of the Allies, to maintain order, whereupon the Autonomous Government declared its mission ended. By Article 7 of the treaty of London in 1915, Italy secretly agreed not to oppose the cession of "Southern Albania" to Greece, should her Allies so desire. It looked, therefore, as if Northern Epeiros would become Greek, and in December, 1915, like Imbros, Tenedos and Kastellorizon, it sent deputies to the Greek Parliament, who were not allowed to sit. But, in 1916, as the Germanophiles, then in power at Athens, were suspected of using this region as a channel of communication with the enemy, Italy was allowed to occupy it for purely military reasons. The Italians began by appointing a Moslem mayor of Cheimarra, whose notables were exiled in considerable numbers to the Sicilian islet of Favignana, deposed the Greek authorities, and on the festival of the Italian Constitution, June 3, 1917, General Ferrero, without consulting the Allies, proclaimed at Argyrokastron, by the order of Baron Sonnino, "the unity and independence of *all* Albania under the ægis and the protection of the Kingdom of Italy." This proclamation wounded French, no less than Greek, susceptibilities.

because, on December 12, 1916, France had erected an Albanian Republic at Koritsa and had later occupied Preveza as the Italians Parga and Joannina. But after the deposition of King Constantine, M. Venizelos, while refusing to allow the Northern Epeirote deputies to sit in the Greek Parliament, so as to avoid international complications, obtained the Italian evacuation of Joannina and Northern Epeiros. The Venizelos-Tittoni agreement pledged Italy to support the Greek claim to Northern Epeiros at the Paris Conference, which accordingly, in January, 1920, assigned the provinces of Argyrokastron and Koritsa to Greece, subject to American consent. As President Wilson categorically refused it, the offer was withdrawn, and in November, 1921, the Conference of Ambassadors definitely awarded both provinces to Albania. As for the islet of Saseno, M. Venizelos had ceded that to Albania in 1914, but it was occupied by Italy towards the end of that year, and, in virtue of the Tirana agreement of 1920, is still Italian. Thus Northern Epeiros was lost for Greece; from the Italian occupation it, at any rate, obtained material advantages in the shape of roads and aqueducts; of the poor Albanian state it will be the richest portion, probably destined to pay for improvements in the more warlike and recalcitrant North.

In June, 1914, Greece seemed on the brink of another war with Turkey. The Germans prompted the willing Turks to deport the Greek population, which from the dawn of history had inhabited the

coast of Asia Minor, for the Greek traders were an obstacle alike to German expansion and Turkish centralization. In April the writer saw shiploads of Greeks from Turkish Thrace land at Salonika. But the expulsion of the Asiatic Greeks was on a larger scale, and the assignment of the big islands of Chios and Lesbos, both near the mainland, to Greece had alarmed the Turkish Government, which feared their use as a base against Asia Minor, and had an excuse for its action in the need of finding homes for the Moslem refugees from Macedonia. Greeks were boycotted; foreign firms were asked to dismiss their Greek employees; and an occasional massacre, as at Phocæa, lent point to the statement made by a Turkish diplomatist that "if Greece does not restore the islands, we will persecute the Greeks in Turkey." Briefly, the Asiatic Greeks were to be treated like the Armenians. Only, unlike the Armenians, they could appeal to a Government of their own race for protection, and they did not appeal in vain. M. Venizelos protested strongly against the expulsion of 30,000 Greeks, adding that the Greek Government would not be responsible for the consequences, unless this persecution ceased, and purchased two American battleships, thus trumping the Turkish purchase of a dreadnought then being constructed in England for Brazil. The Turks, as usual, yielded to the argument of force, the Grand Vizier arranged to meet M. Venizelos, and their meeting was only prevented by the outbreak of the European war.

CHAPTER XII

GREECE DURING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS (1914-21)

M. VENIZELOS was at Munich on this business when the news of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia reached him. Greece was bound to Serbia by the treaty of alliance, signed in 1913, and her Premier, interrogated by his Serbian colleague, replied that, "while reserving his opinion on the application of the treaty in the event of an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia," Greece would stand by her ally in case Bulgaria should attack the latter. He added to M. Streit, his Foreign Minister, that "at no price should Greece be induced to enter the camp opposed to Serbia." Thus, at the outset, the Premier clearly and unmistakeably defined his policy.

The position of Greece was difficult. She had only a year earlier emerged with considerable losses in men from the two Balkan wars; she had just been on the verge of war with Turkey, and the Premier confessed that he dreaded the possibility of a Turko-Bulgarian coalition against her, the Turks taking the islands and the Bulgars

Macedonia. His own sympathies and convictions in the general European struggle were wholeheartedly with the Allies; they were the protecting Powers of Greece, while Germany had been the power behind Turkey; and in those early days, before the labours of the German propaganda and the undiplomatic blunders of the Allies at Athens, the Greek people was not Germanophil. But King George, an anti-German, who, as a Dane, remembered the seizure of Schleswig-Holstein, was alas! dead, his successor was a German Field-Marshal, and his successor's wife the Kaiser's sister. Besides, on two recent occasions, in the question of Kavalla and at the Epeirote Conference at Corfu, Germany had supported Greece. On these grounds the Kaiser appealed to his brother-in-law to enter the war as his ally. King Constantine replied on August 7 :

“The Emperor knows that My personal sympathies and My political opinions draw Me to His side. I shall never forget that it is to Him that we owe Kavalla. After ripe reflexion it is, however, impossible for Me to see how I could be useful to Him, if I mobilized My army immediately. The Mediterranean is at the mercy of the united British and French fleets. They would destroy our navy and merchant marine, they would take our islands, and above all they would prevent the concentration of My army, which can be effectuated only by sea, since a railway does not yet exist. Without being able to be in any way

useful to Him, we should be wiped from the map. I am forced to think that neutrality is imposed upon us, which could be very useful to Him, with the assurance that we will not touch His friends among My neighbours, as long as they do not touch our local Balkan interests.”¹

The Premier, however, realized, after Turkey's acquisition of the German vessels, *Goeben* and *Breslau*, that sooner or later she might attack Greece, and he, therefore, wished to fight her with the help of the Allies, declaring that if Turkey went to war against them, Greece “should put all her forces at their disposal, on condition of being guaranteed against the Bulgarian peril.” The British Government, in recognition of this attitude, told him that the British fleet would not allow the Turkish fleet to leave the Dardanelles, even for the exclusive purpose of attacking Greece, and allowed the Greek troops to re-occupy Northern Epeiros.² The King, however, went back upon this arrangement, informing Admiral Kerr that Greece would not go to war against Turkey, unless Turkey first attacked her. Thereupon M. Venizelos resigned, but his resignation was not accepted, and Col. Metaxas, “the little Moltke” of Greece, was authorized to submit to the British Authorities a plan for taking the Dardanelles. Their rejection

¹ *Documents Diplomatiques* : 1913-1917 (Athènes, 1917), p. 46.

² *Cinq Ans d' Histoire Grecque* : 1912-1917 (Paris, 1917), pp. 13, 16-17.

of this plan, by wounding his professional vanity, made him, already German by education, Germanophil in politics. Yet Greek aid was regarded as valuable by the Allies, especially after the British declaration of war against Turkey on November 5. A month later they offered South Albania (except Valona), if Greece would immediately aid Serbia—an offer raised on January 23, 1915, for the first time, to "very important territorial compensations on the coasts of Asia Minor."¹ In two memoranda to the King the Premier advocated the acceptance of the latter offer, on condition that Bulgarian co-operation were secured, to which end he was ready to sacrifice the Macedonian districts of Sarishaban, Drama and Kavalla, or one-sixtieth of the probable gains in Asia Minor. But this scheme was abandoned owing to the objections of Col. Metaxas to an Asiatic extension of Greek responsibilities, and after the proof of Bulgaria's coming co-operation with the Central Empires afforded by her loan on their money-markets. Then came the Allies' attack upon the Dardanelles, to which the Premier proposed to contribute one army-corps. But here again Col. Metaxas blocked the way by tendering his resignation. M. Venizelos asked the King to summon a Crown Council composed of all ex-Premiers, and reduced his proposal to the despatch of one division. The Council supported him; but the King refused his consent, and M. Venizelos resigned.

¹ Maccas, *L'Hellénisme de l'Asie-Mineure*, p. 154.

The new Premier, M. Gounares, a lawyer from Patras, did not inspire the Allies with the confidence which they had bestowed upon the fallen statesman. Besides there was a power behind the Cabinet and the throne in the persons of the King's confidential advisers, M. Streit, a German by origin, Col. Metaxas and General Dousmanes—all three for various reasons on the side of Germany. Still the Allies continued their offers, promising the *vilâyet* of Aïdin as the reward of intervention. The Cabinet agreed to intervene, if the Allies would guarantee Greece's territorial integrity during, and for some time after, the war. No reply was sent to this answer: it was probably considered deceptive. The entry of Italy into the war on May 24, 1915, complicated the situation; for beneficial as it was from a military standpoint, it increased the Allies' diplomatic difficulties at Athens, where Count Bosdari, the Italian Minister, did not pursue the same policy as his colleagues. Since 1912 Italo-Greek relations had been strained, and M. Venizelos, idolized in Britain and France, was regarded in Italy as an obstacle to Italian expansion, which would profit more from a weak than a strong Greece, nor did the Allies' offer of Kavalla to Bulgaria make them more popular. M. Gounares' Ministry was, however, brief. Beaten at the polls by the Venizelists, who had fifty-eight majority over all parties, he clung to office for seventy days after his defeat, on the pretext of the King's illness. The Royal recovery, ascribed

by the populace to the intervention of the miraculous Virgin of Tenos, whose image was brought to Athens, greatly enhanced the prestige of the monarch who had slain the Bulgars and—as his escape from the fire at Tatoi again proved—obviously enjoyed the special favour of Providence. The German propaganda, worked by Baron Schenk, further diffused the gospel of neutrality.

The second Venizelist Cabinet lasted only six weeks. The Premier informed Serbia and the Powers that Greece “would tolerate no aggression by Bulgaria against Serbia,” and, when Bulgaria mobilized, proposed to the King that Greece should mobilize also. The King replied: “I will not take part in the war. We should be beaten by Germany.” When told that it was his duty as a constitutional monarch to follow his Minister’s policy, approved by the country at the recent elections, he said: “I recognize my obligation to obey the popular verdict whenever it is a question of internal questions, but when it is a question of external questions, I must insist that My idea be followed, for I am responsible before God.” This was the divine right of Kings, a doctrine never claimed by Otho or George, but which smacked of Charles I of England and William I and II of Prussia. As it was now clear that Bulgaria was on the point of attacking Serbia, the Premier applied to the Entente for 150,000 men. But a few hours before the landing of the first Anglo-French detachment at Salonika he had been

dismissed because of his reply to Theotokes' question as to what he would do if, in aiding Serbia, Greece met German troops, viz. that she would act as her honour demanded.

Meanwhile it had long been known at Sofia that, whatever happened, Greek neutrality was assured. Indeed, the new Premier, M. Zaïmes (the former High Commissioner in Crete), remarked that he had taken office with the express purpose of not executing the Serbian treaty! Nevertheless, thanks to his reputation, he received the confidence of the Allies and the offer of Cyprus. But an incident, provoked by his Minister of War, caused his defeat, the nomination of the aged M. Skouloudes as his successor, with a Cabinet of "old men," and another General Election, from which the Venizelists abstained. It was clear that, as long as the King reigned, Greece would not assist the Allies, and might even attack them in the rear. Two incidents branded the Skouloudes Ministry: its refusal to allow the Serbian troops, then in Corfu after their retreat across Albania, to traverse the Greek railways on their way to join the Allies at Salonika, and its ignominious surrender of Fort Roupel, which commands the Struma valley, to the descendants of those same Bulgarians from whom the Greek Emperor, Theodore II Laskaris, had captured it in 1255, but to whom Constantine, "the Bulgar-slayer," restored it in 1916. This cost the Greeks the loss of Northern Epeiros, which could no longer be safely entrusted to Greek

troops, the proclamation of martial law by General Sarrail in Macedonia, and the note of the three protecting Powers on June 21, demanding the reduction of the army to a peace footing, the immediate replacement of the Cabinet by a colourless Government, the dissolution of the Chamber, a fresh election, and the removal of certain obnoxious police officials. The ever-useful M. Zaïmes replaced M. Skouloudes, promising to execute these demands. Rarely had an independent state received such a humiliation; Greece, as a Greek diplomatist said to the writer, had "become a public place," in which the Allies planted themselves where they chose, at Corfu, Salonika, Moudros, Joannina and Preveza, while the Bulgarians invaded Eastern Macedonia, thus making an election impossible. The Bulgars occupied Kavalla, and 8,000 Greek soldiers were "interned" by the Germans at Görlitz. This so greatly disgusted patriotic officers at Salonika, that they formed a Committee of National Defence under the Cretan, Col. Zymbrakakes, repudiating the Athens Government. This movement, unsuccessful at the moment, was the forerunner of the Venizelist Provisional Government of Salonika.

M. Venizelos had reluctantly come to the conclusion that nothing but a revolution would change Greek policy, for the new Kalogeropoulos Cabinet, although favourable to the Allies, was powerless to counteract the King's secret advisers. He, therefore, left for Crete on September 25,

whence he proceeded to Salonika, where, with General Dangles and Admiral Koundouriotes, he founded the Provisional Government, while the King entrusted the task of forming a Cabinet to Professor Lampros, the eminent mediæval scholar, a Germanophil without experience of politics. Greece was thenceforth divided into two camps—Athens and Salonika, separated by a neutral zone; Greek colonies throughout the world took sides; island after island joined Salonika, and Venizelist troops fought by the side of the Allies, while the attitude of the Royalists became more and more suspicious. Accordingly, the French Admiral demanded the surrender of the Greek torpedo flotilla, the disarmament of the battleships, the control of the Piræus-Larissa railway, the Piræus harbour and the Salamis Arsenal. He also obtained the departure of enemy diplomatists, and demanded the delivery of ten mountain batteries by December 1. When that day arrived, a small Allied force was suddenly attacked by the Royalists, many were killed, and the Queen triumphantly telegraphed to her brother that there had been “a great victory over four Great Powers, whose troops fled before the Greeks and later retired under the escort of Greek troops,” adding: “May the infamous swine receive the punishment which they deserve!”¹ This humiliation was followed next day by an attack upon the

¹ *Documents Diplomatiques* : 1913-1917. Supplément, pp. 82, 94.

persons and property of Athenian Venizelists, while the Premier's historical knowledge was probably responsible for the "Anathema" of stones cast upon their absent leader—a reminiscence of the similar "anathema" upon the Athenian primates who had supported the tyrant Hadji Ali in 1785. For nearly four months no Athenian Venizelist newspapers were published.

Great was the indignation in France and England at their humiliation. But the punishment was limited to a blockade, to the demand for the withdrawal of Greek troops within the Peloponnese, and to the salute of the Allied flags. The Allies were not agreed; Kings are a trade-union; and King Constantine, in particular, had powerful connections. Finally, however, M. Jonnart was sent as High Commissioner of the protecting Powers to Athens to demand his abdication in favour of one of his sons (except the Germanophil Crown Prince), while French troops entered Thessaly. The duty of communicating this ultimatum to the King devolved upon M. Zaïmes, who for the fifth time had become Premier. There was no resistance, for this time the Allies had ample forces at hand and the will to use them. On June 12, the King "agreed to leave the country with the Crown Prince, appointing as his successor Prince Alexander," his second son. Two days later he embarked quietly at Oropos for Switzerland; the blockade was raised, and on June 27 M. Venizelos became Prime

Minister of King Alexander. The Chamber elected in June, 1915, was summoned, on the ground that its dissolution was unconstitutional; Greece joined the Allies in the war, and at Skra and elsewhere contributed to their victory upon the Macedonian front, thus gaining a claim to compensation at the Peace Conference, while, in 1920, the Greeks, as the police of the Allies, were entrusted with the task of fighting the Kemalists in Asia Minor.

Thanks to the personal authority of M. Venizelos, the Greek share was larger than any one else could have obtained. By the treaties of Neuilly and Sèvres, between the Allies and Bulgaria and Turkey respectively in 1919 and 1920, Greece received Thrace almost up to the Chatalja lines, and two of the three remaining Turkish islands of the Ægean, Imbros and Tenedos, subject to their disarmament (Kastellorizon being handed to Italy). Smyrna and its territory remained nominally Turkish, in token of which a Turkish flag (following Cretan precedent) was to fly over one of its outer forts; but Greece was to exercise the rights of sovereignty over the city and territory with a local Parliament, which in five years' time might ask the Council of the League of Nations for their "definitive incorporation in the Kingdom of Greece." Although the Dodekanese was formally ceded to Italy, the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement had arranged for its transference (except Rhodes) to Greece. These territorial gains were

a great triumph for their author, but some doubted whether Greece could assimilate them, especially as they were not purely Hellenic. It was asked whether Bulgaria, now cut off from the Ægean, would be permanently content with the "economic outlets" promised her there; whether this double acquisition in Europe and Asia would not sow the seeds of a future Turko-Bulgarian alliance; whether, after M. Venizelos' time, his gigantic creation, like those of the great Serbian Tsar, Dushan, and the great Bulgarian Tsars, Simeon and John Asên II, would survive their creator. Already the arrival of Greek troops in Smyrna in 1919 had been the signal for a serious riot; and the Greco-Turkish war in Asia has proved to be a drawn game. Italy also was opposed to a Greek Smyrna, alleging that Mr. Lloyd George had promised it to her at the St. Jean de Maurienne Conference of 1917. But M. Venizelos argued that the Thracian coast in Bulgarian hands might become a submarine base and that Bulgaria by her conduct had no claim to benevolence, while, if Greece were one day to recover Constantinople, it was essential that her land continuity should not be broken by a Bulgarian Thrace. He applied the principle of self-determination to the Greeks of Western Asia Minor (whom he estimated at 818,221), preferring union to autonomy on the ground that the latter would only create a larger Samian or Cretan question, and indicating the difficulty of replacing under Turkish rule the vast

numbers of Asiatic Greeks expelled before, and during, the war—for since 1915 the persecutions and expulsions had increased. These figures excluded the Greeks of Trebizond (where a Greek Empire existed from 1204 to 1461), whom their Archbishop sought to form into an autonomous state, but whom the Premier would have attached to Armenia, and those of Brûsa, whom he left to Turkey. Constantinople remained the Turkish capital on condition that Turkey executed the treaty; and, despite the historic claims of Greece to Santa Sophia, that famous church was left to the Moslems. But the "Holy Mountain" of Athos remains—under Greece—a theocratic Republic.

When we reflect that in 1909 the acquisition of Crete alone would have been considered a great feat, it might have been thought that the artisan of this Hellenic all-but Empire would have been idolized by his countrymen. But three months after the treaty of Sèvres he was a defeated exile. Various causes produced this unexpected result. He attributed his defeat to the long mobilization of the army; it was also due to his long absence from Greece owing to the protracted peace negotiations. His lieutenants were far inferior to himself; their unpopularity descended upon him; and, as Gladstone repudiated the title of "Gladstonian," so Venizelos might repudiate that of "Venizelist." Meanwhile, Royalist intrigues were conducted from Switzerland, and the marriage of one of the Princes with an American millionairess provided

the sinews of propaganda. Constantine had never "abdicated"; he had only "left his country"; his popularity as a soldier was great with the people, while the impeachment of Royalist ex-Ministers and the expulsion of Royalist supporters increased the numbers of the discontented. A plot against the Premier was discovered at Athens; two Greek officers tried to assassinate him in Paris. Then, on October 25, 1920, the death of King Alexander, due to a monkey's bite, created a reaction in favour of the exile, and the elections were fought on the personal question: Constantine or Venizelos. Meanwhile, Admiral Koundouriotis acted as Regent till Prince Paul, the late King's younger brother, should make up his mind to accept the Crown. But the elections of November 14 decided for Constantine; M. Venizelos was not even elected, resigned and left Greece, whereupon Rhalles for the fifth time became Premier. His first act was to substitute the Queen-Mother Olga as Regent for Admiral Koundouriotis, his next to hold a *plébiscite* for the restoration of Constantine. The result was a foregone conclusion, and on December 20 Constantine reached Athens. Great Britain and France imposed no obstacle to the will of the people, while Italy rejoiced at the downfall of the Greek Cavour. The Italians were guided by self-interest, but history contains few examples of national ingratitude such as that of the Greeks. They have already had cause to repent.

The Restoration did not, as had been said at the elections, bring peace, but a continuation of the war in Asia Minor, while it inevitably prolonged the domestic discord; for exiles, returning after three years' banishment, wanted the places of those in office. Nor were the Royalist leaders united: Rhalles soon made way for Kalogeropoulos, and the latter for Gounares; but none of them possessed the weight and influence of their great rival in the Councils of the Allies. Northern Epeiros was lost; the cry went up for the revision of the treaty of Sèvres; two of the Great Powers now have Turkophil policies, the third is wavering. But it must be remembered that the Greek people was tired with eight years of almost constant mobilization, that elections are nowhere won on foreign policy but on local questions, and that to win them election agents are as necessary as statesmen. M. Venizelos, as his friend, the Roumanian Minister, T. Joneseu, told the writer, was "too big a man for a small country." Greece invented ostracism.

Here, for the present, ends her history. If the centenary of the War of Independence did not fall on happy times, the Greeks have nevertheless made great progress since 1821. First, as regards territory: while Turkey, which in 1801 covered nearly the whole Balkan peninsula, was left at Sèvres with only 2,238 square miles and 1,281,000 inhabitants in Europe, and those chiefly in Constantinople, Greece contains some 8,000,000

inhabitants, of whom, however, about 2,000,000 are estimated to be non-Greeks ; but outside the Kingdom there are still about 2,500,000 Greeks, of whom a million are scattered about the world, rather over a million remain in Asia Minor, Constantinople and its European territory, 43,000 resided in Bulgaria before the Balkan wars, 151,000 have been lost with Northern Epeiros, and the rest may one day come to Greece with Cyprus and the Dodekanese. Whether Constantinople will become Greek again is uncertain. The treaty of Sèvres hinted at such an eventuality, but Greece is no longer the favourite child of the Entente. It may be doubted whether, apart from historical arguments, its possession would materially benefit "Old " Greece. Indeed, mediæval history points the lesson that Byzantium exploited "Old " Greece for its own purposes, and only when the Byzantine Empire shrank to a mere fragment of suburban territory did Mistrâ assume importance. To-day there is antagonism between Byzantine and Athenian Hellenism : the former is Venizelist, the latter Constantinian ; and the Royalist Government wished to delay the election to the Patriarchate, vacant for three years, for fear lest a Venizelist Patriarch should be chosen.¹ Greece is too small for two great cities ; the question of precedence between Athens and Constantinople would be difficult, while there would be the danger of Bulgarian interruption of the land communica-

¹ As was the case.

tion between the two. No Balkan State wants Greece at Constantinople: Roumania has lately said so; and the Powers, now that Bolshevism has, at least temporarily, eliminated the Russian candidature, have acquiesced in the half-measure of leaving the Turk there. That this will be permanent is improbable; but, when he finally retires to Asia Minor, whence he came, the most likely solution, although by no means ideal, would seem to be international control. Still, we cannot expect the Greeks, with their strong Byzantine memories and acute historic sense, to cease regarding Constantinople as pre-eminently their "City," and Santa Sophia their holy of holies. Only, as Bismarck said of Prussia before her consolidation: "the equipment is too big for the tiny body." A scattered state is hard to defend. If Greece obtained Byzantium, could she maintain it in war, or administer it in peace?

But, as no country should know better than Greece, the greatness of states does not depend upon their mileage. Both intensively, as well as in extent, Greece has greatly progressed in the century of her independence. Athens is now one of the finest cities of the South, and owes its rapid development in large measure to that fervent patriotism of "the outside Greeks," which prompts them to spend their fortunes upon beautifying the capital of their free brethren. To Epeirote "benefactors"—a recognized class in Greece—Athens owes many public foundations. Intellectual-

ally, as is natural in a race so eager to learn, the advance has been rapid. Illiteracy has greatly diminished; and, if the figures of illiteracy in the census of 1907 for "Old Greece"—66·27 per cent.—seem high, that is partly due to the large proportion of elderly illiterates inherited from Turkish Thessaly and British Zante, where little was done under our protectorate for primary education. By 1914 the number of pupils in elementary schools had already increased by 40,487. The acquisitions of the Bucharest and Sèvres treaties will give the schoolmaster much work to make up for Turkish neglect; but the Greek element in "New" Greece already had numerous schools, provided by patriotic Hellenes. Greek estimates¹ give them as 1,011 with 59,640 pupils for Macedonia, 562 with 42,890 pupils for Thrace, 179 with 22,296 pupils for Constantinople and Chatalja, 405 with 56,525 pupils for the Smyrna *vilâyet*, 1,646 with 108,726 pupils for the rest of Asia Minor (including the Dardanelles), 12 with 1,835 pupils in Imbros and Tenedos, and 131 with 11,122 pupils in the Dodekanese and Kastellorizon, besides those in Cyprus, Crete, Samos and the other islands conquered from Turkey. Here again quality as well as quantity must be considered. Greek, like most foreign education, is too literary; it does not develop character; and M. Venizelos, therefore,

¹ Colocotronis, *La Macédoine et l'Hellénisme* (Paris, 1919), p. 614; Soteriadis, *An Ethnological Map* (London, 1918), pp. 14-15.

desired the experiment of a school on British lines. The boy scout movement has to a certain extent supplied that physical training which the ancient Greeks considered an integral part of education. Greek athletes distinguished themselves at the Olympic Games of 1896 and 1906: a Greek won the Marathon race at the former, another Greek delighted the spectators by his graceful quoit-throwing at the latter. But the little Greek loves his books far more than does the little Briton, and it is pathetic to see the small boot-blacks of Athens poring over manuals at night-schools. For one class, the clergy, intellectual education is far behind ours. The late Metropolitan, a Cypriote bishop, resolved to raise the educational level of the Greek priest who is often a mere peasant, but perhaps for that reason, especially as he is married, better able to enter into the lives of his parishioners. There are few traces in Greece that learning prevents men from excelling in commerce; it has, however, a tendency to make the Greeks regard it as the one thing necessary to success and to judge less learned Balkan races accordingly.

The language question has handicapped the development of a modern literature of the imagination; but, after King Constantine's deposition, the "vulgar" tongue was ordered to be the medium of elementary instruction, and Venizelist journals ridiculed Royalist "smart" society for talking French. But the historical studies of

Lampros (who would have written better if he had written less), Sathas, Meliarakes, Kampouriglos and Philadelphus have illuminated the Mediæval and Turkish periods, while Paparregopoulos wrote a masterly "History of the Greek Nation." Professor Andreades is an eminent economist, known far beyond Greece. Bikelas and Drosines produced good novels and devoted themselves to the diffusion of useful knowledge by a series of popular handbooks. British readers can form some idea of the short story from "Tales of a Greek Island," by Julia Dragoumis, and "Modern Greek Stories," translated by Demetra Vaka. Roides and Zampelios published popular historical novels, Bernardakes and Rangabes classical and historical plays. "Jean Moréas" was a Greek of Paris. Greek, like Italian, authors suffer from the popularity of translations from the French, which all educated Greeks read. In Soures Athens lost a modern Aristophanes, for his weekly journal, *Romeós*, written entirely by himself in verse, was a genial satire on contemporary events. But modern, like Byzantine, Greek literature is rather instructive than original, learned than popular, historical than romantic.

There remains journalism, which flourishes to an extent unknown in other countries of the same size. The Greek press is intensely political, and very well written. Every one reads it, many believe it. It has played an important part in political history, and the "conversion" of many

newspapers during the war was one obstacle to the Allies. In normal times, when there is no censorship, it keeps the people well-informed about the political affairs of "mankind from China to Peru," and especially about what the Briton "intends, and what the French." Its caricatures have sometimes been excellent, but latterly the paper famine has curtailed its space. Unfortunately, those who write in Greek suffer in "Europe" from the mediæval maxim : *Græcum est, non legitur*.

The territorial acquisitions of the last nine years should greatly increase the economic progress of Greece. In 1914 the cultivable area of "Old" Greece, largely rocky, was only 24 per cent., even after the draining of the Copaïc lake. The annexation of Macedonia will ultimately increase this percentage, when that troubled province finally enjoys peace, and its plains can be scientifically cultivated and its marshes drained. Still more is hoped from Thrace and the Asiatic territory, where, under favourable conditions, the Greek is content to till the soil. Elsewhere, he prefers the sea or the shop. Goats and intentional forest fires have diminished the woods ; but the last sixty years have witnessed considerable activity in mining, in which British capital has participated ; but Greek industries are crippled by the lack of coal, and Greece is not, therefore, a manufacturing country. A result of this is the tardy appearance of Socialism as a political party. Class distinctions

are, for historical reasons, less important among Greeks than elsewhere. The mediæval *archontes* have left no successors; titles are confined to the Ionian Islands; and, although a certain halo invests the descendants of Revolutionary families, men like Admiral Koundouriotes and M. Zaïmes—the Greek equivalents of our Russells and Cavendishes—Greece is a country in which a career is essentially open to talent. Possibly that fact makes Greece more difficult to govern than countries where the vast mass occupies itself with politics only at elections.

The present moment is scarcely propitious to an optimistic survey of Greece's future. Her barometer, after a sudden rise, has as suddenly fallen; her European influence, based upon that of one man, has declined with his decline. That is the usual lesson of Balkan history, for in South-Eastern Europe the individual has always been the determining factor. Had such a man arrived earlier in the last century, before rival competitors to the Turkish heritage had had time to grow up, had, for example, Kolettes been a Venizelos, Greece would have to-day a less disputed position in the Near East. The Turk has now practically disappeared from Europe, but the Greek has not sole possession of his abandoned territories. The late war has left Roumania and Jugo-Slavia far larger than Greece, while Bulgaria has not abandoned her aspirations to Thrace and Macedonia. Roumania, doubtless, is more a Danubian and


Carpathian than a Balkan state, and Jugo-Slavia (if she holds together) should look Westward rather than Southward, to the Adriatic rather than to the Ægean. But experience shows that no Balkan settlement is durable, that the Eastern question is insoluble. Long before the Turks entered Europe, Greeks, Serbs and Bulgars fought for the hegemony of the peninsula, in which their historic lots have been cast ; nor is there reason for believing that their rivalries will cease, now that the Turks have practically retired from the field.

A Balkan Confederation is a dream ; even a Balkan Alliance, projected by Trikoupes and realized by M. Venizelos, lasted but a few months. Racial antipathies in the Balkans are so strong and so deep, human life is held in so little account, and historical traditions play so important a part in inter-Balkan politics, that reason and common-sense, or, in other words, compromise, can rarely prevail over Chauvinism, even when there is no Great Power behind the scenes to encourage discord or keep some running sore open. And such sores still exist—witness the uncertainty whether Albania can live, and the interest that some have that she shall live precariously or not at all. Yet, could the Balkan races but be left alone to manage, or even mismanage, their own affairs, and could they come to a lasting settlement with each other, it would be difficult to find a more talented combination. The Greeks would contribute the

intelligence and the superior civilization, the Bulgarians the rude tenacity of purpose and strength of character, the Jugoslavs the romantic element, and, in the case of the Croats, the valuable experience gained from a long period of Western administration. The Greeks have learned in recent times the lesson, inculcated by Byron, to "trust not for freedom to the Franks," but to their own exertions, to think less of their remote ancestors and more of themselves, to realize that Marathon should not eclipse Kilkich, and that foreign Governments do not direct their policy mainly for the furtherance of Hellenic interests, unless those happen to coincide with their own. And here Greece possesses an advantage, denied to all her neighbours,—the existence of powerful and patriotic Greek colonies in foreign capitals, able to collect and impart information for, and about, Greece. Probably her greatest obstacle is politics in the parliamentary sense of the word: the personal rivalry of politicians for power—money is not a consideration to the Greek statesman, who serves his country for a pittance and usually leaves office poorer than he entered it. Long, stable administrations thus become difficult; and, in the new system of arranging international affairs by direct contact between Premiers, a nation loses influence when it often changes its representative. For this reason a Greek Republic seems unthinkable; what Greek would command, and keep, the support of a large majority of his

fellow-countrymen? Yet the late war showed that in Greece monarchy has its disadvantages, and it is unfortunate that there can be no system for the spontaneous generation of Crown Princes, so that Balkan monarchs need not seek consorts in countries whose interests are widely different. But the personal monarchy in Greece is only a transient phenomenon: the half-century of George is the rule, the early years of Otho and Constantine the exception. The present is an uncertain period of transition; whereas Hellenic democracy is "half as old as time."

NOTE.—The Paris Conference of March, 1922, revised the treaty of Sèvres by moving the Greek frontier in Thrace back to a line drawn from near Ganos on the Sea of Marmora to the Bulgarian frontier on the west of the Stranja Mountains, and restoring Smyrna with its *Hinterland* to direct Turkish rule. This decision has so far (July, 1922) not been executed.



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